

The Anti-Chosun Movement: Journalism, Activism, Politics, and Historical Memory in Post-Authoritarian South Korea, 1998–2002

PATRICK VIERTHALER¹ PhD Student, Kyoto University

Abstract

This article reconstructs the origins and development of the so-called Anti-Chosun Movement, a (progressive) movement to curb the power and shed light on the history of (conservative) mass media, from its origins in the mid-1990s to its politicization in the 2002 presidential elections. The development of Anti-Chosun reveals the intertwinement of journalism, activism, and politics in post-authoritarian South Korea. Further, Anti-Chosun constitutes the first movement originating in cyberspace, demonstrating the centrality of online journalism. Finally, Anti-Chosun must be evaluated as an omen of Korea's "history wars," its discourse taking place firmly within a framework of historical fact-finding and transitional justice.

Keywords: Korea, Anti-Chosun, *Chosun ilbo*, historical memory, *chirilpa*, Roh Moo-hyun, *Ohmynews*, activism, New Right

South Korean society since the mid-2000s has repeatedly experienced at times fierce clashes over its history. Not just the context of textbooks or the nature of memorial days, even the writings of academics were at times the object of disputes

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF KOREAN STUDIES, VOLUME 21, NO. 2 (2022), pp. 111–162.

taking place not only among members of civil society, but reaching far into the realms of media, politics, and even the judiciary. As a result, scholars speak of present-day South Korea as a society in a “psycho-historical fragmentation,”³ experiencing not only bilateral, but also domestic “history wars.”⁴ These “history wars” are both rooted in, and a manifestation of post-authoritarian South Korea’s institutional and ideological polarization. Within the existing literature, the intensification of disputes over history, or rather historical memory—i.e., “history as it is remembered” as opposed to “history as it happened”⁵—into “history wars” is commonly connected to the rise of the so-called New Right movement since 2004, which ultimately was successful in influencing official policies during the Lee Myung-bak (2008–2013) and Park Geun-hye (2013–2017) administrations.⁶ However, to center the emergence of historical disputes solely on the New Right neglects the structural and institutional continuities before and after 1987.⁷ While democratization entailed a free press, continuities in the realms of politics, academia, or mass media are crucial in understanding post-authoritarian South Korea.⁸

In what is referred to as the “1987-System” by some scholars,⁹ a polarization commonly referred to as “conservatives” and “progressives” within South Korea diffuses into the country’s politics, media, civil society, and academia. Politically, for the first three decades following democratization, this institutional divide has manifested itself in a strong regionalism,¹⁰ reflecting the legacy of the South Korean state’s establishment and its developmental policies of the 1960s–1970s, favoring economic development in the southeastern regions of Yŏngnam (Pusan, Taegu and the Kyŏngsang Provinces) at the expense of the southwestern regions of Honam (Kwangju and the Chŏlla Provinces). This regionalism is further reflected in the history of state violence after 1945, with the Honam region and the island of Jeju having witnessed brutal massacres in the name of anti-communism, which the Jeju April 3 Incident of 1948¹¹ and the Kwangju Massacre of 1980¹² exemplify. As a consequence, this regional divide is visible in election results. Since 1987, “conservatives” are often defined as the successors to the autocratic period’s ruling elite, while “progressives” trace their genealogy in opposition to the establishment. Ultimately, in the 1990s and early 2000s, this polarization is reflected in the country’s media landscape, with the three large media conglomerates of *Chosun ilbo*, *Tonga ilbo*, and *Joongang ilbo* generally said to fall into the “conservative” spectrum, while newly established media such as the *Hankyoreh* (1986), the monthly *Mal* (1985), in addition to the center-progressive *Kyunghyang sinmun*, are regarded as “progressive.”¹³

Through shifting the focus to the 1990s, the present study aims to expand the historical focus beyond the mid-2000s, examining a hitherto overlooked, crucial

cause for the increasing polarization that ultimately led to the emergence of the New Right Movement and the outbreak of the South Korean “history wars,” namely the relationship between mass media (= journalism), civil society, politics, and historical memory up until 2003/04. The 1990s were pivotal for several reasons. First, in relation to its history, South Korea in the 1990s was undergoing a transitional period from authoritarianism to democracy. Light was shed on past state violence, and new findings enabled more nuanced understandings of Korean modern and contemporary history.¹⁴ Partial openings of Soviet and Chinese archives led to new understandings into the process of division and war on the Korean peninsula,¹⁵ and a growing interest in oral history led to a boom in history from local and individual angles. Amidst political and institutional continuities, the historical memory of South Koreans began to shift towards an elite-critical, “progressive” memory, in which the discourse on pro-Japanese collaborators, so-called *ch'inilp'a*,¹⁶ and their role in the Republic of Korea (ROK) and its political crimes, took center stage.¹⁷ Second, despite numerous institutional continuities—especially the National Security Law (NSL)—the post-Cold War era marks a rift in South Korean society. Besides political democratization, on a psychological level, shifting geopolitics during the 1990s, the inclusion of both North and South Korea into the United Nations in 1991 and Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy (1998–2003), signaled a break with the past. For South Koreans, the rivalry of systems was all but over; the South had emerged as the clear winner. These shifts, ultimately, would redraw political and social coordinates within the South—mostly along existing lines, however.¹⁸ With the conservatives still firmly in power,¹⁹ the 1990s marked a period in which progressive ideals, especially progressive historical consciousness, now represented by actors within institutions, gradually became mainstream.²⁰ Third, the digital turn was significant in transforming South Korean life in the late 1990s. South Korea was among the earliest nations to expand broadband internet connections, leading to changes in all areas of society.²¹ By 2000—long before the advent of smartphones, portal sites, and fake news became issues—so-called citizen’s journalism emerged as an alternative to the existing media landscape.²² Social activists, too, began to assemble online, and before too long, the internet had played a decisive role in the outcome of the 2002 presidential election.²³ Finally, while civic activism of the 1980s²⁴ and 2000s²⁵ has received a significant attention within English-language scholarship in recent years, the mid-1990s remain an under-researched field.

Examining the so-called Anti-Chosun Movement in this context is significant, because the movement and its origins exemplify the transitions that South Korean society went through in the late 1990s and early 2000s. As I will argue, neither

the origins nor the development of the Anti-Chosun discourse would have been possible without the transformations mentioned above. Crucially, Anti-Chosun's influence on both progressives and conservatives uncovers, as I will argue, a significant cause for the emergence of the New Right movement in late 2004. In this context, I evaluate the Anti-Chosun Movement as an omen to South Korea's "history wars," as a discourse incorporating all the characteristics that were later visible in disputes over high-school history textbooks,²⁶ memorial days,²⁷ museums,²⁸ and even in defamation lawsuits surrounding academic writings on contested historical topics.²⁹

Existing studies on the Anti-Chosun Movement suffer from two shortcomings: either they were written by activists involved at a time the movement was still in its heyday, and as such constitute primary sources rather than existing studies³⁰ or they were inconsistent in their use of sources. In English-language scholarship, Song Yeunjee is the only available study discussing the topic.³¹ In her dissertation on the *ch'inilp'a* discourse, Song mentions the Anti-Chosun Movement, albeit without going into much detail. Song's study is significant in that it has drawn my interest to the subject, but suffers from an incomplete citation of primary sources. In Korean-language works, the essayist, activist, and blogger Han Yun-hyŏng has published a massive, 500-page monograph on the history of Anti-Chosun, but his work suffers from a lack of focus.³² Han's monograph belongs to the realm of journalistic account rather than academic study. Nevertheless, Han's study is significant in that it includes, albeit in a highly unsorted fashion, a large number of details regarding the development of the Anti-Chosun Movement. Therefore, Han's monograph serves as an orientation of where to start and what to look into for further research.

With the above shortcomings in prior studies, the goal for the present research is to write a well-structured chronological account of Anti-Chosun supported by a meticulous use of primary sources. For this paper, I trace the origins and development of the Anti-Chosun discourse through the lens of a historian. Reconstructing its history through the use of primary sources from both involved parties and media, I aim to exposit an account of the *Chosun ilbo* issue from the mid-1990s to the emergence of the New Right movement. As it is impossible to write a definitive history of the movement and its branches, I focus on the most important developments and actors in order to provide a foundation for further study into individual aspects of the movement as analyzed in the pages below.

Early attempts at highlighting the Chosun issue, 1992–1998

Kang Chun-man: An Outsider's Voice in Calling Attention to the Chosun ilbo Issue

The emergence of the *Chosun ilbo*³³ newspaper as a disputed issue (*nonjöm*) in South Korean society is closely tied to Kang Chun-man (강준만 姜俊晩), a professor of media studies, essayist, and political commentator.³⁴ Having studied in the US,³⁵ Kang saw himself neither as a progressive nor a conservative. His early work was grounded in the logic of Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Hermann's *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (1988). Thus, Kang approached *Chosun ilbo* in the belief that media discourse, influenced by special interests of media proprietors and advertisers, continued to underpin the rule of the conservative establishment in South Korea.³⁶ In 1995, a monograph in which Kang traced how Korean mass media had repeatedly attempted to paint a negative image of Kim Dae-jung became a best-seller, turning Kang into a famous writer overnight.³⁷ In the foreword, Kang heavily criticized how, among the media conglomerates in the ROK—the *Chosun ilbo* in particular—as the country's best-selling newspaper, are shaping public opinion in South Korean society. To Kang, *Chosun ilbo* was constituting “not just the country's best-selling newspaper (but) the newspaper that is setting the agenda in our society,”³⁸ a newspaper that was at the same time “fundamentally ideological (and) commercial,” pretending “to ride on the train of democratization,” while at the same time remaining a hardline, Cold War stance on the North Korea issue.³⁹ Firmly in the ownership of the Pang dynasty,⁴⁰ Kang also criticizes how the owners praise themselves as constituting a constant, unchanging shadow presidency as opposed to the elected presidents who came and went.⁴¹

Already three years prior, Kang went much further in a February 1992 essay entitled “Dismantling all aspects of *Chosun ilbo*,” setting the agenda for his later crusade against the newspaper. Despite Kang's emphasis on pointing out the issue of *Chosun ilbo* in post-authoritarian South Korea, namely in the role the newspaper played in deciding the 1992 presidential elections, Kang also calls attention to *Chosun's* role in Korea's modern and contemporary history, in particular to the relationship between the newspaper and the authoritarian regimes of Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan.⁴² By praising Chun Doo-hwan and the state's actions in Kwangju, Kang argues, *Chosun ilbo* was able to achieve its dominant position within the South Korean media landscape after the 1980s.⁴³ Kang supports his argument with *Chosun* articles from 1980 reporting on the Kwangju Massacre. On 28 May 1980, for example, *Chosun ilbo's* editorial praised the military's take-over of the city, writing: “One thing is clear at the present. The

citizens of Kwangju need not feel any danger, fear or insecurity. ... We must not forget the hard work of the military and their cautious actions.”⁴⁴ In a strikingly similar fashion, Kang introduces, that *Chosun* welcomed Park Chung-hee’s coup d’état in 1961, writing that “this is an extraordinarily happy moment for the majority of our citizens.”⁴⁵ In this context, Kang already in this essay points out the issue of *Chosun ilbo* as a historically collaborationist newspaper fraternizing with the ruling elite, laying the discursive groundwork for later developments of the Anti-Chosun Movement.⁴⁶ At the same time, Kang refrains from criticizing the newspaper as “conservative,” instead stressing its nature as an “opportunistic” newspaper.⁴⁷ By doing so, Kang avoids falling into the discursive trap of simplification into progressive and conservative.

Kang’s interest in the *Chosun* issue was directly reflected in the editorial stance of his journal *Inmul kwa sasang*, established in May 1998, in the wake of the Kim Dae-jung’s election as South Korea’s first progressive president. From the first issue onwards, *Chosun ilbo* was prominent in the journal, with critique of the newspaper centering, for the months from May to October, on its political reporting and the editorials of Kim Tae-jung⁴⁸ and Ryu Kün-il.⁴⁹ In those years, Kang Chun-man was, despite the success of his 1995 monograph, mostly writing as a voice from outside the established intellectual spectrum. Kang’s views were a minority, but they were later taken on by Anti-Chosun activists. While Kang did also point out issues concerning the history and historical views of *Chosun ilbo*, his main interests were laying out the relationship between politicians and journalists, and the reliance of intellectuals on big media to gain a stage for discourse, and media reform.

KBS’s Reform Documentary and Chosun ilbo, April–September 1998

In addition to Kang and his pioneering role in the *Chosun* issue, an incident surrounding a documentary program at KBS (Korea Broadcasting Station) in April–September 1998 brought to light the newspaper’s difficult relationship with its own past. As part of a larger reform of Korea’s public broadcaster, the production of a three-episode documentary to shed light on the close relationship between politics and media during the Fifth Republic, titled *Ije nün mal handa* (이제는 말한다 Now speak about it), was in planning by a newly formed journalistic team. In addition to critically examining KBS’s own role during those years, a separate episode on *Chosun ilbo* was planned to air as part of this program on 3 May.⁵⁰




Figure 1 A caricature printed in the progressive *Hankyoreh* on 30 April 1998, following a week of events in which it was made public that a planned KBS documentary critically examining the history of *Chosun ilbo* during the autocratic period would not be aired.



Figure 2 An article in the November 1998 issue of *Wŏlgan chosun*, which caused the Choi Chang-jip Incident. In it, Choi’s scholarship is distorted and misquoted to paint him as a “pro-North” “leftist” and to undermine his credibility as a presidential advisor.

However, neither of the planned episodes did air. Instead, as an article in *Hankyoreh* from 21 April made public, pressure was put on the production team from both within KBS and from outside to change the title of the program.⁵¹ Only on 3–4 September, after a tumultuous back and forth, and repeated pressure from *Chosun ilbo*, did two episodes on KBS’s and *Chosun’s* past entanglement with politics during the autocratic period air, under the name of “Media and power, avoiding responsibility.”⁵² This was met, unsurprisingly, with opposition from *Chosun ilbo* and *Tonga ilbo*,⁵³ but no further actions from the newspaper(s)

followed. This incident reveals that concerning its history, *Chosun ilbo* was determined to suppress any criticism, and Korea's public broadcaster in mid-1998 was ready to succumb to such pressure.

The Ch'oe Chang-jip Incident and the Origins of Anti-Chosun

In the November issue of *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (Monthly Chosun), an article concerning the scholarship of Ch'oe Chang-jip (Choi Chang-jip) (최장집 崔章集), a distinguished historian of the Korean War and a renowned political scientist,⁵⁴ who in 1998 was serving as advisor to President Kim Dae-jung, was published.⁵⁵ The article takes Ch'oe's scholarship out of context, quoting Ch'oe writing that Kim Il Sung's decision to attack the South in 1950 was a "historic step" (*yŏksajŏgin kyŏldan*), and that the biggest victims of the war were the people (*minjung*) in the North. This was taken as proof by the author of the article, as well as the journalist Yi Han-u (Lee Han-u 이한우 李翰雨)⁵⁶ in two follow-up articles in the daily,⁵⁷ that Ch'oe's historical views were damaging Southern legitimacy and constituting a "pro-North" stance—in other words punishable under South Korea's anti-communist National Security Law.⁵⁸ *Chosun ilbo* journalists went so far as to narrate the articles as a "thought inspection" (*sasang kŏmjŭng* 思想檢證), bringing back the darkest day of the Red Purge in authoritarian South Korea.⁵⁹

On 23 October, Ch'oe sued the newspaper for 500 million won in damages over distorting and misquoting his historical views, demanding a prohibition of the distribution of the November issue.⁶⁰ On 11 November, the Seoul District Court reached a verdict, forcing a prohibition of distribution for *Wŏlgan Chosŏn*'s November issue, for *Chosun ilbo* to delete all related articles from the internet, and arguing that *Chosun ilbo*'s actions constituted a defamation of Ch'oe's scholarship.⁶¹ The newspaper filed an appeal. On 19 January 2000, however, Ch'oe declared that he would withdraw his lawsuit, having reached a mediation with *Chosun ilbo*.⁶²

While the Ch'oe Incident appeared to have ended with the settlement between the two parties, criticism toward *Chosun ilbo* had been intensifying since November, centering on the two journals *Inmul kwa sasang* and *Mal*, in particular the writings of Kang Chun-man and Chŏng Chi-hwan (정지환), which intensified in the weeks after the Incident.⁶³ In one article, Kang introduces Yi as an academic with an expertise in Ch'oe's writings, astonished to read that Yi himself wrote the article from 26 October.⁶⁴ For Kang, Yi Han-u's case—similar to that of Yu Kŭn-il—exemplifies a "false consciousness" of *Chosun ilbo* journalists as "running the country."⁶⁵ The *Chosun ilbo* journalists Kang terms a "private army," who were shaken by the inauguration of the Kim Dae-jung administration, which,

for *Chosun ilbo*, marked a watershed in which it lost its close relationship to the corridors of power.⁶⁶ In this context, Kang observes a shift to the right in Yi since joining *Chosun ilbo*, a “metamorphosis into a cold-hearted ‘contractor’ who runs a knife into the revered professor at his alma mater.”⁶⁷ Chŏng Chi-hwan connects the controversy to a “*ch’iniil(p’a)* complex,” introducing Yi as an example of a “schizophrenic journalist.” Acknowledging that, while Yi may be an outstanding thinker, “there are serious issues with his ‘intellectual conscience’,” and, furthermore, highlights, just as Kang does, that Yi, even after he joined *Chosun ilbo* in 1995, had previously highly evaluated Ch’oe’s scholarship and even quoted him within his own writings on Syngman Rhee.⁶⁸ Thus, to Chŏng, Yi’s participation in the witch-hunt was schizophrenic, i.e., academically accepting Ch’oe’s writings but, for the sake of *Chosun ilbo* and its negative reporting on the Kim Dae-jung administration, denouncing his “thoughts.”

On 1 December, Yi Han-u filed a lawsuit in the Seoul District Court against Kang, Chŏng, and Kang Chun-u,⁶⁹ demanding one-hundred million won compensation for defamation from each for the two articles introduced above.⁷⁰ With public interest in the issue having faded after Ch’oe’s settlement with the newspaper, Kang and Chŏng were forced to fight defamation lawsuits without significant media interest. Aggravating this difficulty was the fact that, aside from a number of articles in *Hankyoreh*, other newspapers were not reporting the developments.⁷¹

However, through the activities of Kang Chun-man fighting his defamation lawsuit, the *Chosun ilbo* issue gradually gained traction in the wake of the Ch’oe Incident. In April–June 1999, two books on the issue were published,⁷² assembling intellectuals (like Kim Tong-min or Yu Si-min) who later became central within the Anti-Chosun Movement. In addition, Kang launched a “Find-your-place-movement” (Che Mok Ch’ajajugi Undong 제 몫 찾아주기 운동), a movement to stop buying the newspaper. Already on 19 November 1998, he had established the Joint Measures Committee on Falsifying and Distorted Reporting in the *Chosun Ilbo* (*Chosŏn Ilbo Hŏwi—Waegok Podo Kongdong Taech’aeK Wiwŏnhoe 조선일보 허위·왜곡 보도 공동대책위원회*).⁷³ However, as Kim Tong-min notes, these activities were seriously weakened when Ch’oe decided to settle with *Chosun ilbo*, leaving little room for further developments towards a *Chosun ilbo*-critical movement.⁷⁴ While Kang and Chŏng continued fighting their lawsuits, such “militant writings”⁷⁵ and focused activities began to make the *Chosun ilbo* issue gradually visible among (mostly progressive) intellectuals, laying the personnel foundations for Anti-Chosun as a movement.⁷⁶

Urimodu, “Sue me!”, and the birth of “Anti-Chosun”

One year after the Ch’oe Incident, on 19 November 1999, the Seoul district court reached a verdict in the three lawsuits against Kang Chun-man, Chŏng Chi-hwan, and Kang Chun-u, ordering Kang Chun-man and *Inmul kwa sasang* to pay seven million won of compensation and Chŏng four million won of compensation to Yi Han-u, whose honor had been, according to the court, defamed in the December 1998 articles.⁷⁷

The Establishment of Urimodu

Immediately after the verdict was made public, the bulletin board on the website of *Inmul kwa sasang* experienced a significant rise in posts, from approximately forty per day before to over two-hundred per day after the verdict.⁷⁸ Among the discussions, the idea of collecting the compensation fee through crowdfunding appeared, which was eventually accepted by Chŏng.⁷⁹ In another thread, a lengthy back and forth argument, the essayist Chin Chung-gwŏn (진중권) of *Inmul kwa sasang* and Yi Han-u clashed over the interpretations of the events since the Ch’oe Incident.⁸⁰ These heated discussions re-strengthened interest in the *Chosun ilbo* issue beyond progressive intellectuals. On 22 November 1999, only three days after the verdict became public, a new group emerged, marking the beginning of what was to turn into the “Anti-Chosun Movement”: Anti-Chosun Urimodu (안티조선 우리모두 “We are all against Chosun,” henceforth Urimodu).⁸¹ In early January 2000, a website with the same name opened its doors,⁸² becoming the discursive foundation for the Anti-Chosun Movement.⁸³

The creation of Urimodu marks the point in which the *Chosun ilbo* issue was—at the grassroots level—separated from the *Inmul kwa sasang* bulletin board.⁸⁴ With a dedicated space for discussing *Chosun ilbo*, Urimodu made the arguments of Anti-Chosun easily accessible—albeit limited to a (at this stage still) rather small number of people with access to PCs and an active interest in the issue. During these days—the exact date is impossible to verify due to technical issues—a user named “Ember” proposed the need for a more organized “Anti-Chosun” as a civic movement. In this context, the term “Anti-Chosun” (안티조선) appears to have been first used. With this, the *Chosun ilbo* issue had transformed into Anti-Chosun.⁸⁵

A column in the progressive *Hankyoreh* on 29 November further aggravated the visibility of *Chosun ilbo*-critical discourse. Reacting to the verdicts against Kang Chun-man and Chŏng Chi-hwan, Hong Se-hwa (홍세화 洪世和), a former underground activist involved in the Preparatory Committee for a National Front to Liberate South Korea (Nam-Chosŏn Minjok Haebang Chŏnsŏn Chunbi Wiwŏnhoe 남조선 민족 해방 전선준비 위원회),⁸⁶ who had lived in exile in France since 1979

(only returning to South Korea in 2002), contrasted the recent court rulings to a verdict in France. In the French case, the far-right politician Jean-Marie Le Pen had successfully sued a critical journalist for defamation, only to outrage a large portion of the French left-wing as a result, who were crying “Sue me!” in unison. By introducing this example, Hong hoped to provide a rally call—“Sue me!” (*na rül koso hara!* 나를 고소하라!)—for intellectuals critical of the status quo in Korea:

My interest lies (neither in the honor of a *Chosun ilbo* journalist or the French far-right, but), to phrase it simply, in “Korea’s honor” (and) in overcoming the extremist camps in our society and their mouth piece, the *Chosun ilbo*. This is why I declare (...): “Sue me!”⁸⁷

Hong’s column resonated with the supporters of Urimodu. From the very start, the website featured a corner in which supporters could sign a petition entitled “Sue me!” The result of this campaign was a full-page ad paid by Urimodu users that was published in *Hankyoreh* in the 7 July 2000 issue under the name of “Urimodu, Citizen’s Assembly of those who Oppose *Chosun ilbo*.”⁸⁸

The ad stated, in large letters, “Hey *Chosun ilbo*, sue me!”, followed by a text explaining the main goals of the Urimodu activists and including the names and e-mail addresses of 1,748 signees over two thirds of the page. In the ad, Urimodu introduced the origins of Anti-Chosun in the Ch’oe Incident, further connecting it to the more recent developments of conservative media reporting in the 2000 general elections⁸⁹ and on the Sunshine Policy. In language highly evocative of historical events and memories, the text states: “The tragedy of a newspaper, which has repeatedly engaged in pro-Japanese, pro-dictatorship, and anti-democratic activities, calling itself the reasonable paper of the Korean people must now be corrected. (...) We must correct the wrong ways of communication (concerning inter-Korean relations and domestic polarization) and aim to condemn the arrogance of *Chosun ilbo*.”⁹⁰

The ad gave Urimodu visibility beyond its core membership. In two days, the number of signatures rose to 2,142,⁹¹ among them Ri Yŏng-hŭi,⁹² an eminent figure among progressive intellectuals in contemporary South Korea. In the coming weeks, the momentum that the Anti-Chosun discourse gained out of these developments would prove crucial in transforming the issue into a movement.

The Hwang Sök-yŏng Incident

Around this time, a controversy surrounding a literary prize sponsored by *Chosun ilbo* took place. In May–July, Hwang Sök-yŏng (황석영 黃皙暎), a progressive novelist, got involved in the Anti-Chosun discourse. Hwang’s work has been shaped by opposition to military dictatorship in the 1970s and 1980s. He had

visited North Korea in 1989 and underwent voluntary exile in New York and Germany thereafter before returning to South Korea in 1993, where he was arrested on charges of violating the National Security Law (NSL) and sentenced to seven years in prison. Hwang was only released by a presidential pardon from Kim Dae-jung in 1998.

On 7 June 2000, *Seoul sinmun* reported a decision by Hwang to turn down interviews with *Chosun ilbo*.⁹³ This announcement was preceded by a dispute surrounding an interview of Hwang's with *Chosun ilbo* published on 18 May (the anniversary of the Kwangju Massacre),⁹⁴ after which Hwang was heavily criticized by Urimodu users. Hwang's public declaration to decline any further interviews with the newspaper was, according to the article, the first such public declaration by an intellectual. Over the next weeks, it was made public that Hwang's novel *Orae toen chŏngwŏn* (오래된 정원 The ancient garden), his first novel since the 1980s, would be nominated for the Tongin Literature Prize, an award sponsored by *Chosun ilbo*.⁹⁵

In an essay published in *Hankyoreh* on 19 July, Hwang announced that he would reject the nomination for the prize, citing *Chosun ilbo*'s "collusion with the fascist military dictatorship" and its influence as an "ideologue for the establishment" as his major reasons. He further assessed the newspaper as a "prime-example of reactionary media" whose reform is a "necessity for historical development in the context of our times."⁹⁶ Placing his opposition to the newspaper (and the literary prize associated with it) in the context of settling past affairs, Hwang further emphasizes a need for a "detailed, mass movement for media reform that clearly lays out an alternative."⁹⁷

Anti-Chosun as a civic movement

Against the above background, in the summer of 2000, the *Chosun ilbo* discourse significantly gained visibility, helping to transform Anti-Chosun into a civic movement. One contributing factor for this development lay in the First North-South Summit held on 15 June 2000. While progressives were unequivocally welcoming Kim Dae-jung's policy of détente with the North, conservatives—and in particular the *Chosun ilbo*—rallied against any such attempts.

According to Kim Tong-min (김동민 金東敏), a central figure in the Anti-Chosun Movement after 2000, the atmosphere following the First North-South Summit was significantly different from that during the Ch'oe Chang-jip Incident two years earlier, with *Chosun ilbo* increasingly "opposing reforms (and) repeating confrontationist Cold War rhetoric."⁹⁸ In order to spread awareness of the *Chosun ilbo* issue and ultimately re-shape the consciousness of Koreans regarding their media

landscape, an increasing number of intellectuals feel the need for establishing Anti-Chosun as a civic movement, continued Kim.⁹⁹ A second, not neglectable factor, was the establishment of new, progressive media based online—especially the internet-based newspapers *Ddanzi ilbo* (딤지일보) and *Ohmynews*. This progressive online media helped advance the popularization of Anti-Chosun ideas, as their reporting centrally featured the issue, much more so than established, progressive print media.¹⁰⁰

The Establishment of the Anti-Chosun Federation, August–October 2000

On 7 August 2000, a “First manifesto of intellectuals rejecting *Chosun ilbo*” (*Chosŏn ilbo rŭl kŏbu hanŭn che-il-ja chisik’in sŏnŏn* 조선일보를 거부하는 제1차 지식인 선언) was made public, followed by three more manifestos on 11 October (2000), 4 March (2001), and 20 September (2001). These manifestos mark the point when the *Chosun ilbo* issue moved beyond a small circle of progressive intellectuals and Urimodu netizens. The language of the first, and all the following manifestos, places Anti-Chosun firmly within the language of transitional justice as a gradual, on-going process of settling the past:

South Korean society finally, at this time, has broken down the walls of autocracy and division and set off on a long journey towards democracy and peaceful unification. This is the time when we must, by reforming, settle the legacy that dictatorship, corruption, and irrationality have left us for this transitional period. Amidst the fact that not even the remnants of the Japanese Empire have been settled, there can be no bright future without setting straight the distorted history that dictators have committed. (...) Indispensable in this process is the element of mass-media.¹⁰¹

The intellectuals signing the manifesto were not only concerned about the form of institutional media, an issue that had been debated in post-authoritarian South Korea since at least the early 1990s, but also, and, especially, in raising awareness for the *Chosun ilbo* issue as one issue in an on-going process of democratization, of dealing with past affairs (과거사 정산 *kwagosa chŏngsan*), of setting history straight (역사 바로 세우기 *yŏksa paro seugi*), and of détente with North Korea.¹⁰²

Criticizing an anti-reform stance of “conservative” media, the manifesto goes on to brand *Chosun ilbo* as a “flunkeyist” (사대주의 *sadaejūi*), i.e., pro-US newspaper that “aims, without doubt, to turn back the wheel of history.”¹⁰³ Out of these reasons, the signees to the manifesto swear, as “reform-oriented or progressive intellectuals ... not to participate in this business model of *Chosun ilbo*,” ultimately demanding that *Chosun ilbo* “repents its past and apologizes in front of the citizens and the nation (*minjok*)” and announcing a boycott of any interview requests from

the newspaper until the first demand is met.¹⁰⁴ This first manifesto was signed by 154 people, among them historian Kim Tong-chun. The second manifesto, signed by 152 more people, also included the renowned historians Kang Man-gil, Han Hong-gu, and Chŏng Hae-gu among its signees. Together, the four manifestos were signed by 1,575 intellectuals. They were significant in opening up the *Chosun ilbo* issue beyond Kang Chun-man and *Inmul kwa sasang*, now drawing the attention of a large part of progressive intellectuals and activists.

Between late August and early October 2000, concrete plans were made to establish a civic organization dedicated to the *Chosun ilbo* issue. In this process, Kim Tong-min of the Citizen's Council on Democratic Media (CCDM)¹⁰⁵ was a leading figure. At first, a name emphasizing the anti-reform and anti-unification stance of *Chosun ilbo* was considered.¹⁰⁶ Eventually, Federation of Citizens Opposing *Chosun ilbo* (*Chosŏn ilbo* Pandae Simin Yŏndae 조선일보 반대 시민연대, hereafter Anti-Chosun Federation or ACF) was adopted as the name of a new umbrella civil organization, assembling over 51 civic organizations under its roof, which itself was closely connected to the institutions of the CCDM. On 20 September 2000, the Anti-Chosun Federation was officially established.¹⁰⁷ On the same day, the second manifesto was released. While the basic contents of the second manifesto remained largely unchanged compared to the First Manifesto, the connection of the Anti-Chosun Movement—as the movement was soon referred to—to an on-going, transitional process of historical truth and reconciliation was apparent in this manifesto, basically the ACF's inaugural declaration, in which the ACF emphasized *Chosun ilbo*'s “distortion of history” and its self-branding as a “conservative” newspaper.¹⁰⁸

Kim Tong-min was to serve as the ACF's representative. As a federation, the ACF itself was rather loosely organized and closely connected institutionally to the CCDM. Even though the movement gradually broadened in scope and structure in the months after August 2000, the ACF remained a very loose organization. Unsurprisingly, its looseness sparked internal disagreements over the precise aims and ways to approach the issue. Discussions within the Anti-Chosun camp centered on: (a) progressive intellectuals publishing within the *Chosun ilbo*; (b) movements to stop buying *Chosun ilbo* or to make subscribers cancel their subscription; and (c) raising awareness through education.¹⁰⁹ For Kim, Anti-Chosun as a comprehensive movement constituted the “completion of democratization,” with the ACF taking on tasks differing from Kang Chun-man and his writing-centered activism.¹¹⁰ Despite internal discussions on the movement's direction, raising awareness through education and other activities was to become central to the movement. Primary sources from the people involved reveal that a central motivation for Anti-Chosun activists did not lie in a “negation” of *Chosun ilbo*. Rather, in an

Table 1 Major activities carried out by the ACF between 2000 and 2004. Compiled by the author, source: ACF Homepage¹¹⁶ and CCDM.¹¹⁷

Date	Activity
2000.10.31–12.1	Public lecture. <i>Published as a monograph.</i> ¹¹⁸
2001.3.5	Assembly to demand an apology from <i>Chosun ilbo</i>
2001.3.26–5.18	One-man demonstrations in front of the <i>Chosun</i> main building
2001.9.18–21	Anti-Chosun cultural festival
2002.1.30	First civic tribunal. <i>Records published</i> ¹¹⁹
2003.4.7–9.30?	First issue of the <i>Weekly Anti-Chosun</i> . <i>Published within a monograph</i> ¹²⁰
2004.5.15	Petition for 10 million signatures demanding an apology from <i>Chosun ilbo</i> over its pro-Japanese collaborator past and ceremony to mark the beginning of an Anti-Chosun “general struggle” at the Kwangju May 18 Memorial Park
2004.10.15	Second civic tribunal against the “anti-national, pro-Japanese collaborator” <i>Chosun ilbo</i>

enlightenment fashion, involved intellectuals aimed to re-shape the consciousness of those Koreans who take the reporting of *Chosun ilbo* as “normal.” In the words of an editorial published in *Tangdae Pip’yŏng*, a progressive monthly, Anti-Chosun’s main aim lay in calling attention to the “reactionary Cold War that has been internalized as the ruling ideology by the people (*minjung*) in their daily life.”¹¹¹

The above-quoted editorial hints at a broader struggle not just against *Chosun ilbo*, but against a “Cold War reactionary establishment,” per se.¹¹² To Kim Tong-min, *Chosun ilbo* did not constitute an ordinary media outlet, but the “central organ of the reactionary political camp,” and, as such, was impossible to be reformed. It was only a subject to be overcome.¹¹³ At the same time, among Anti-Chosun activists, however, critical voices against any type of one-sided media—i.e., the *Hankyoreh* as an equally selective media for the progressive camp—were also voiced,¹¹⁴ revealing a plurality in the Anti-Chosun camp. Despite such internal factional struggles, Kim Tong-min evaluates the ACF’s establishment to have increased visibility of the *Chosun ilbo* issue not only among a large number of progressives, but also within the general public itself.¹¹⁵ However, he acknowledges that due to its nature as a federation closely tied to the CCDM, the ACF was tied by institutional constraints that prevented it from gaining more influence in the following years.

The activities in Table 1, although far from being a complete list, provide a picture into the activities of the ACF. The ACF aimed to spread its views through symbolic one-man demonstrations, but also hoped to increase its profile through

public lectures, a cultural festival, and a self-published weekly journal. As analyzed further below, the staging of two civic tribunals in 2002 and 2004 underlines how central the issue of settling past affairs had become within the Anti-Chosun camp at this stage.

With the establishment of the ACF, the Anti-Chosun Movement even started to receive attention from conservative media. The October 2000 issue of *Tonga ilbo*'s monthly *Sin tonga* featured a special focus on the Anti-Chosun Movement and its development, including a twenty-page interview with Kang Chun-man.¹²¹

The Okch'ŏn Struggle: Anti-Chosun's Possibilities and Its Limits

While Anti-Chosun on a national level remained loose in its structure and organization, the movement was most successful on a local level, in Okch'ŏn County (옥천군 沃川郡), located just east of Taejŏn in South Ch'ungch'ŏng Province. A week after the First Manifesto was proclaimed, O Han-hŭng (오한흥), president of the local newspaper *Okch'ŏn sinmun*, on 15 August 2000, formally declared "independence" from *Chosun ilbo*,¹²² establishing the Okch'ŏn Citizen's Gathering to Properly Understand *Chosun ilbo* (*Chosŏn ilbo* Paro Pogi Okch'ŏn Simin Moim 조선일보 바로보기 옥천시민 모임) on the same day. The name was abbreviated deliberately to "Chosŏn Pabo" (lit. "Chosun idiots").¹²³ The issue having first come to his attention in 1998–1999 when the CCDM had released a pamphlet to raise awareness of the *Chosun ilbo* issue in the wake of the Ch'oe Incident, O began to focus his actions to raise awareness of *Chosun ilbo* in the county, in particular in the context of the on-going collaborator discourse.¹²⁴

Activists involved in the Okch'ŏn group began referring to themselves as "mulch'ong (water gun) independence army" (abbreviated as Mulch'ong 물총). The local Anti-Chosun Movement was soon known as the "Okch'ŏn Struggle" (*Okch'ŏn chŏnt'u* 옥천전투) in the rest of South Korea. The language used in the local Anti-Chosun Movement in Okch'ŏn was militaristic and historical in its connotations and confrontational in its tone. O did proclaim "independence" (독립 *tongnip*) on 15 August, the day South Korea commemorates its liberation or independence from Japanese colonial rule. As such, the influence of *Chosun ilbo* on South Korean society was syntactically compared to being under colonial rule. A logo used on the Mulch'ong website in its early days features a dog urinating on *Chosun ilbo*.¹²⁵ This, Kim Tong-min argues, was no coincidence: instead, Anti-Chosun in Okch'ŏn was crucially connected to the collaborator discourse.¹²⁶ In Okch'ŏn, *Chosun ilbo* was primarily perceived as a pro-Japanese, i.e., anti-national, treacherous newspaper. With *ch'inilp'a* as its main slogan, Anti-Chosun was able to capture a significant amount of attention in the county. Kim asserts that the local

success of Anti-Chosun in Okch'ŏn was made possible only by the presence of a strong local newspaper—O Han-hŭng's *Okch'ŏn sinmun*. Unlike in most regions of South Korea, in which the big conglomerates dominate the market, Okch'ŏn possessed a strong local media and, on top of that, a newspaper owner who was heavily interested in the Anti-Chosun discourse from a historical perspective.

This primarily local Anti-Chosun Movement was quite successful, reducing the number of *Chosun ilbo* subscriptions from approximately 1,200 to 1,500 down to 370 in a county of roughly 60,000 inhabitants.¹²⁷ The local success was chronicled visually in a 77-minute documentary in 2001.¹²⁸ Furthermore, over the next years, events such as national Anti-Chosun gatherings, or “Anti-Chosun marathons” were held in the county. Although aims to form Mulch'ong on a national scale appeared,¹²⁹ the success of Okch'ŏn was not reciprocated elsewhere, despite similar organizations having existed—mostly in the form of netizens—throughout the country. The case of Okch'ŏn, with the presence of a strong regional newspaper and the intertwining with the *ch'inilp'a* discourse, reveals the prospects and limits of Anti-Chosun in early 2000s South Korean society.

Roh Moo-hyun and Anti-Chosun

In hindsight, “we now know”—as historian John L. Gaddis put it—that, after a tumultuous election year, Roh Moo-hyun, narrowly defeating Lee Hoi-chang (= Yi Hoe-ch'ang 이회창) of the Grand National Party, got elected as the ninth president of South Korea in December 2002. Despite Roh's eventual victory, however, until November the same year, even his candidacy on the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) ticket seemed unclear.¹³⁰

Roh Moo-hyun, a high-school graduate who had studied for the bar exam on his own, was an antithesis to South Korea's establishment. Although serving a single term as member of the national assembly from 1988 to 1992, Roh had not managed to re-gain a seat in the upcoming elections, despite his popularity among many ordinary voters. In 1996, he took the gamble of running against Lee Myung-bak, the later president and antithesis to Roh, in the prestigious seat of Jongno, and lost.¹³¹ In 2000, despite the possibility of successfully running in Jongno, Roh went (back) to run in Pusan, a staunchly conservative city, and lost again. In 2000, after he failed to get re-elected for parliament for a third time in a row, Roh's political future seemed unclear. At a time when the Anti-Chosun Movement was just emerging, the 2000 legislative elections were accompanied by the activities of the 2000 General Election Citizen's Federation (2000-nyŏn Ch'ongsŏn Simin Yŏndae 2000 년총선 시민연대, hereafter GECS), a nongovernmental organization (NGO) formed under the umbrella of People's Solidarity

for Participatory Democracy (Ch'amyō Yōndae 참여연대, hereafter PSPD).¹³² The GECS released a list of candidates it hoped to get voted out in the elections, and support candidates they hoped were to assist in the process of political reform. At the time, it was formally illegal for civic organizations to voice support for a political candidate, leading conservative media to discredit the GECS as illegal or even as “terror” against the political establishment.¹³³ Although the conservatives emerged as the victorious party from the elections, the 2000 elections and the activities of the GECS are evaluated as having successfully politicized South Korean NGOs.¹³⁴

In the wake of Roh's defeat in Pusan, supporters of Roh Moo-hyun established the Assembly of Those who Love Roh Moo-hyun (No Mu-hyōn ūl Sarang hanūn Saram ūi Moim 노무현을 사랑하는 사람의 모임, abbr. as Nosamo / 노사모), an online-based political “fan club” for Roh and his ideas.¹³⁵ The first such organization of its kind, Nosamo was to prove crucial in the process of electing Roh to president in 2002. Meanwhile, Roh served as Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries from August 2000 to March 2001. On 10 December 2001, Roh announced that he would run for president on a ticket for the MDP. In April–May 2002, the MDP was holding party-internal primaries—the first such in South Korean history allowing ordinary party members to participate in the electoral process. At that point, within the party, Yi In-jae or Chung Tong-yōng seemed to be the likely candidates for the ticket. However, in the second and third primaries in Ulsan and Kwangju on 10 and 16 March, Roh managed to defeat his opponents. Particularly in Kwangju, Roh made a strong showing, and, despite Yi victories in Daejeon and South Chungcheong, Roh carried most of the remaining primaries. Rhetoric in the primary contests was at times fierce, and throughout the elections, an influence of Anti-Chosun discourse on ordinary party members, but also on Roh himself, was apparent.¹³⁶

On 6 April, in his speech for the Incheon primary (which Roh carried with 51.9% of the vote), Roh explicitly criticized *Chosun ilbo* (and other conservative media) in a speech that did not just heavily attack his party-internal opponent(s), but clearly reveals how Anti-Chosun had an effect on his political views:

Conspiracy theories. Red Purge. Unfounded schemes. Stop these now! It is tough to defend yourself against the badmouthing of the GNP and *Chosun ilbo* kissing each other's heads. (...) I never said, not now and not in the past, to nationalize media. (Yet,) I am attacked (by conservative media) because I am not bending to pressure to abandon owner share limitations. I must not become a president who (...) is submissive to the media. (...) *Tonga ilbo*, *Chosun ilbo*: keep your hands off the MDP primary!¹³⁷



Figure 4 A commemorative photo in front of a sculpture of the poet Chŏng Chi-yong taken to proclaim the “independence” of Okch’ŏn from *Chosun ilbo* in order to create a “beautiful world without *Chosun ilbo*.” 15 August 2000. Source: *Ohmynews*.

At the background of this speech lay a primary in which Yi, Roh’s major rival to the party ticket, denounced Roh as “red,” “leftist,” and “pro-North,” and in which the three major newspapers (*Chosun ilbo*, *Tonga ilbo*, *Chungang ilbo*) took a decisive pro-Yi, anti-Roh stance in their reporting on the MDP primaries,¹³⁸ a result of Roh’s stance on media since a tax investigation of media outlets in the first half of 2001.¹³⁹

Roh himself had, already in mid-November 2001, announced that he would boycott any interviews with *Chosun ilbo*, adopting one of Anti-Chosun’s key demands—boycotting the newspaper.¹⁴⁰ However, Roh’s strained relationship with *Chosun ilbo* dates back to his first term as lawmaker. As Yu Si-min, a later aide of Roh’s, pointed out, *Wŏlgan Chosun* published articles suggesting a hidden wealth in 1991, leading Roh to sue *Chosun ilbo* for defamation, a trial that he ultimately won.¹⁴¹ For *Chosun ilbo*—and other conservatives—Roh’s biography was repeatedly exploited to discredit him. For Roh, whose political agenda consisted of overcoming the country’s political regionalism, as well as strongly advocating for further historical fact-finding in regards to past state violence, this staunch opposition from conservative circles pushed him to, against all

odds, strengthen his ideals. Preceding his run for president, at an event on media reform and Korean politics in July 2001 in Taegu (organized by a “netizen school of journalism” including representatives of *Ohmynews*, *Hankyoreh*, *Inmul kwa sasang*, and the Taegu branch of Anti-Chosun), Roh spoke in the language of a transitional period, equating conservative media with an “on-living red purge,” urging for the need of both media reform and a “reform of history.”¹⁴²

However, Roh himself never publicly declared himself to support Anti-Chosun. Rather, Anti-Chosun played a significant role throughout the primary and election process on the grassroots level. Nosamo—which was not directly connected to Roh—was very close with the Anti-Chosun camp. Its first chairman Myōng Kye-nam (명계남), a movie actor, attended an assembly of Anti-Chosun activists in Okch’ōn in January 2002.¹⁴³ Already by April, the organization had called for the need to curb subscription numbers of *Chosun* and other conservative dailies.¹⁴⁴ Amidst the MDP primaries, the organization laid out “watching” *Chosun ilbo* (and *Donga ilbo*), intellectually attacking, and bringing down their subscription numbers as three crucial tasks for Nosamo during the upcoming election on 29 April.¹⁴⁵ During the primaries, Nosamo received over 1.9 million applications for membership, significantly growing in size. In May, Nosamo openly attacked *Chosun ilbo*. Not “seeing *Chosun* as media,” Nosamo excluded the newspaper from access to its activities, and stated that, besides the goals of press monitoring, lowering subscription numbers, and reforming the election law, Nosamo would declare media reform a number-one priority, more important than Roh becoming president.¹⁴⁶ Both the ACF and Mulch’ōng highly welcomed Myōng’s remarks, expecting to provide a foundation for a broader movement.¹⁴⁷ *Ohmynews* took this as an omen that Anti-Chosun was witnessing a second rebirth.¹⁴⁸ *Chosun*



Figure 5 Anti-Chosun fans distributed by Joase during the 2002 soccer world cup. Source: *Ohmynews*, 24 June 2002.



Figure 6 Joase activists handing out Anti-Chosun material in the streets of Seoul, September 2002. Source: *Ohmynews*, 19 September 2002.

ilbo reacted to these developments, decrying Nosamo as a “vulgar organization.” Myōng, on the other hand, defended his actions, defining Nosamo as a civic, not a political, movement.¹⁴⁹

In an interview with *Ohmynews*, Myōng explained that a movement to make people stop reading *Chosun ilbo* was ultimately a movement to “present our members with sources revealing the harmful effects of *Chosun ilbo*, and show them the pro-Japanese, anti-national actions of this newspaper.”¹⁵⁰ In other words, Myōng and Nosamo, at this point, were openly embracing the discursive foundations laid out by the activities of Kang Chun-man and the activists involved in Urimodu, the ACF, and Mulch’ong throughout Korea. Just as in these other developments, the *ch’inilp’a*-card—as a metaphor for past betrayal, opportunism, and state violence—became central to the opposition to *Chosun ilbo* within the pro-Roh camp during the 2002 elections.

Anti-Chosun as a mass-movement: the establishment of Joase (Choase)

At the same time that Anti-Chosun began to play a role in the presidential elections, another new stream of Anti-Chosun was beginning to form itself: “A Beautiful World Without *Chosun Ilbo* (*Chosŏn Ilbo Őmnŭn Arŭmdaun Sesang* 조선일보 없는 아름다운 세상, abbrev. Joase or 조아세). Unlike the Anti-Chosun groups so far, who remained largely centered within intellectuals, a local area, or the internet, Joase had from the start aimed at “taking Urimodu to the streets” as a broad civic



Figure 7 *Ttak*, a pamphlet produced by Joase, distributed roughly 400,000 times.

movement aiming to “transform and spread Anti-Chosun as a movement into daily life.”¹⁵¹ Acknowledging influence in the success of three recent grassroots communities—Urimodu, Nosamo, and Insamo¹⁵²—Joase hopes lay in uniting these camps and their shared interest for Anti-Chosun, thus raising awareness for the need of, and paving the way for a substantial media reform. Established in June 2002¹⁵³—during the 2002 football world cup—and led by Im Hyŏn-gu (임현구), a website, www.joase.org, went online in July 2002. Joase’s name itself was certainly influenced by O Han-hŭng’s proclamation of “independence” on 15 August 2000. The same name—“a beautiful world without *Chosun ilbo*”—had been used at the one-year anniversary event in Okch’ŏn and, by early November 2001, as the title of a pamphlet produced in Okch’ŏn with the attempt to make the Okch’ŏn Struggle a broader, more national movement.

One of Joase’s first activities was the distribution of roughly 220,000 Anti-Chosun round fans during the world cup.¹⁵⁴ While the South Korean team was showing a remarkable performance at the tournament, Joase activists seized the momentum to highlight how, in their eyes, *Chosun ilbo* was using its monopoly to spread its views into Korean society. In this case, activists emphasized how, just a few months prior, *Chosun ilbo* had held highly negative views towards Guus Hiddink, the Dutch coach of Korea’s national team.

However, from the start, Joase’s activities revealed—despite their goal of reforming the Korean media system—a centrality of the *ch’inilp’a* discourse. On 15 August 2002, the memorial day marking the liberation from Japanese colonial



Figure 8 A scene from a national Anti-Chosun gathering in central Seoul under the slogan of “Chosun ilbo, enemy of peace, enemy of the people,” involving activists from the ACF, Mulch’ong, Joase, and other organizations. Source: *Ohmynews*, 17 November 2002.



Figure 9 A Joase demonstration in front of the Independence Hall of Korea in Chŏnam City, South Ch’ungchŏng Province. The front banner reads: “An (Independence) Hall or a Collaborator Memorial?”. Source: *Ohmynews*, 1 March 2003.

rule, some 40 Joase activists together with members of the Kyŏnggi CCDM staged a demonstration in front of the Independence Hall of Korea in Ch’ŏnan.¹⁵⁵ At the gate, activists demanded the removal of a rotary press used by *Chosun ilbo* during the colonial period. Furthermore, Joase activists installed a temporary exhibition, highlighting the “pro-Japanese” past of *Chosun ilbo*. By doing so, Joase hoped to raise awareness about the nature of *Chosun ilbo* as a collaborationist newspaper,

as opposed to its official memory as an “ethnic newspaper” (*minjokji*)—a term that activists demanded the same day be omitted from school textbooks in reference to *Chosun ilbo*. In September, Joase released a booklet, *Ttak!* (딱! Like this!). Where previous activities by Kang Chung-man or the ACF had included a compilation of books or organized lectures, Joase put together its main arguments in an easily digestible form,¹⁵⁶ taking Anti-Chosun directly to the people by distributing *Ttak!* at busy places throughout Seoul: bus terminals, subway stations, or in front of sport events.¹⁵⁷ Just before the Ch’usŏk holidays, Joase activists gathered at bus terminals to spread the message beyond urban areas. By then, over 400,000 copies of *Ttak!* had been distributed in less than a month.¹⁵⁸ By this time, Joase had grown to roughly 1,500 members, of which 300–400 were heavily involved in the organization’s activities.¹⁵⁹ In a relatively short span of time, Joase had thus emerged as a third major stream of Anti-Chosun activism, taking a prominent spot at events like a national assembly of Anti-Chosun groups held on 17 November 2002 (figure 8), or the demonstration mentioned above in front of the Independence Hall of Korea on 1 March 2003 (figure 9).¹⁶⁰

The success of Joase and its activities garnered a reaction from *Chosun ilbo*. On 23 October, *Chosun ilbo*’s head office formally sued Joase for, among others, obstruction of business and defamation of honor.¹⁶¹ Unlike previous defamation suites, this was the first time that *Chosun ilbo*, as a company,¹⁶² sued a civic movement. To progressive observers, this was proof of the success of Joase and a sense of crisis for *Chosun ilbo*.¹⁶³ Joase’s activities, however, rarely uncovered new facts—this work had been mostly carried out by Kang or the ACF earlier. Also, subscription numbers themselves did not change significantly (with the sole exception of Okch’ŏn County).

Joase marks the emergence of Anti-Chosun as a visible grassroots movement within the greater city of Seoul. Its success lay in taking the discourse onto the streets, and by doing so raising the profile of Anti-Chosun far into other layers of society. An opinion poll from 14 August 2002, published by *Newsweek Korea*, shows a strong support for Anti-Chosun among Koreans in their 20s and 30s.¹⁶⁴ Similarly, regarding influence as opposed to subscription numbers, the gap between KBS as the country’s most-influential media, and *Chosun ilbo*, was said to have widened significantly during the first half of 2002, with the influence of *Chosun ilbo*’s major editorialists (Kim Tae-jung, Ryu Kŭn-il [Yuu Kŭn-il] and Cho Kap-je [Cho Gap-je]¹⁶⁵), having also dropped significantly.¹⁶⁶ The Anti-Chosun camp, however, decided to fight back. In a press conference held on 8 November 2002, Joase announced that it would counter-sue the newspaper: “The issue of *Chosun ilbo*, i.e., (...) in order to cater to the pro-Japanese and pro-US flunkeyists, as well as the military dictatorship, has been committing to false, distorted, and

biased reporting, and recently has been negligent. (...) We accuse *Chosun ilbo* on the altar of ethnic history.”¹⁶⁷

As such, the year 2002 marks the time when Anti-Chosun took an important place within Korean progressives. Not only did Anti-Chosun, through the activities of Nosamo, albeit indirectly, play a crucial role in the presidential election, but also, through the activities of Joase, gained influence among (mostly younger) Koreans.

The Roh Moo-hyun administration, Anti-Chosun, and the emergence of the New Right

Unsurprisingly, Roh Moo-hyun maintained his critical stance toward conservative media even after he was inaugurated president in February 2003. The conservative dailies, too, continued—just as they had done during the Kim Dae-jung administration—to sharply criticize the new administration. For Nosamo, the election of Roh as president, marked a crossroads. While some called for the dissolution of the NGO, the ACF chairman Kim Tong-min, in an article published in *Ohmynews*, called for Nosamo to openly embrace Anti-Chosun and media reform as its central task, seeing support for Roh against *Chojungdong*, an acronym for the three big conservative dailies *Chosun ilbo*, *Joongang ilbo*, and *Tonga ilbo*.¹⁶⁸ Strongly against any disbandment of Nosamo, another *Ohmynews* article argues that “defending Roh from the nepotist press and the reactionary establishment” and preparing for the upcoming 2004 general election are the upcoming tasks for Nosamo and supporters.¹⁶⁹ Media reform, in other words, was at the forefront of progressive hopes by the end of 2002. Gradually, within the supporters behind Roh, the bogey man had shifted from *Chosun ilbo* to *Chojungdong*. Taken together, the term *chokpöl öllon* (적벌 언론 elite clan-owned media), in combination with *sugu seryök* (수구 세력 reactionary camp) and *kidükkwön* (기득권 establishment), was increasingly used by progressives in their advocacy for media reform.¹⁷⁰ The reactionary establishment, to Nosamo supporters, consisted of the reactionary press, the *ch'inilp'a*, and the remnants of military dictatorship, which were seen within the GNP, the strongest party within the South Korean parliament.¹⁷¹

The fears of Nosamo activists proved true when, just a year later, Roh faced an impeachment orchestrated by the GNP, before the general election. Roh, who had voiced support for his newly-created United Uri Party (Yöllin Uri-dang 열린우리당, hereafter Uri party), was said to have broken a law that requires presidents to remain neutral for legislative elections. Nevertheless, the Uri Party managed to gain a decisive victory in the elections, giving the progressives—for the first time in South Korean history—a majority in the national assembly. In October 2004, Roh’s

government announced the will to undertake a significant media reform, along with abolishing the NSL and reforming the nation's education system. Despite Roh's parliamentary majority, the anticipated reforms of 2004 failed. Roh's attempted media reform and his on-going critical stance toward conservative media spurred a reorientation among disillusioned conservatives. Aided by the three conservative dailies, the so-called New Right movement emerged,¹⁷² ultimately gaining significant influence in the corridors of power during the Lee Myung-bak administration.¹⁷³ Although initially framed as an attempt to overcome existing divisions within South Korean politics and society,¹⁷⁴ in the long term, their rise and eventual influence on the GNP rather cemented existing rifts, especially in relation to the issues of media reform and historical memory or truth and reconciliation.

Of course, Anti-Chosun was by far not the only factor in this development. The prevalence of the collaborator discourse among progressives amidst Roh's push for a state-led truth and reconciliation commission, as well as continuing détente with North Korea, and a de-centralization of history textbooks, all did their part in gearing up conservatives—now under the banner of a “new” right—for relentless opposition to Roh and the progressive camp. The political and ideological coordinates of post-authoritarian South Korea had, by this point, reached a level that remained unchanged for the next 10 to 15 years.

Observations: Anti-Chosun and historical memory

Kim Tong-min was one of the activists most actively involved in raising awareness of the *Chosun ilbo* issue in regards to history and historical memory. He emphasized the function of Anti-Chosun in the wider context of setting history straight:

The first act that we must carry out in order to open up the history of a new era is (...) to thoroughly repent and settle wrong history. It is impossible to create a new, healthy history without assessing and settling the mistakes of the past.¹⁷⁵

In this context, Anti-Chosun mainly focused on three issues: (1) *Chosun ilbo* as a pro-Japanese, i.e., collaborationist newspaper before liberation; (2) the close connection between *Chosun ilbo* and Park Chung-hee during the 1960s and 1970s; and (3) the history of *Chosun ilbo* in connection to the Kwangju Massacre and the rise of the Chun Doo-hwan regime.¹⁷⁶ Taken together, Kim terms this the “three submissive histories of *Chosun ilbo*.”¹⁷⁷

Regarding the *ch'inilp'a* issue, Kim Tong-min highlights that, against the newspaper's own history as a proud, ethnic newspaper, *Chosun ilbo* instead was opportunistic during the colonial period, especially during the war years after 1937.¹⁷⁸ The issue, however, is further intertwined with the post-liberation elite.

That is, in the shadow of the emerging Cold War, attempts to purge and convict former collaborators were interrupted in the name of anti-communism, and many former collaborators retained their posts, forming the core of the ROK elite after the 1960s. This history is referred to by Kim as a “concealment of the past,”¹⁷⁹ and reflects criticism that was already made by Kang Chun-man four years earlier.¹⁸⁰

In the eyes of Kim, these activities were considered treacherous to the Korean nation:

[After liberation,] those who were pro-Japanese during the period of the Japanese Empire almost unequivocally prolonged their political life by taking a pro-US stance. *Chosun ilbo* walked precisely the same way. They had no interest in the future of either the state (*kukka*) or the nation (*minjok*) (...).

As a newspaper speaking for the nation, in other words a national newspaper (*minjokji*), seen through the context of world history, [*Chosun ilbo*] had to take on the role of correctly reading international affairs after the end of WWII, provide a course for national history, and determine the strength of the people (*minjung*). At that time, the historical task [of Koreans] can be expressed by the creation of a unified, independent, sovereign state. What did the *Chosun ilbo* do?

Just like other pro-Japanese collaborators who spent the liberation period in hiding, President Pang U-yŏng groped for resurgence by adopting a pro-US, anti-communist ideological stance. To say nothing of repenting for his pro-Japanese activities, he once again started walking an anti-national (*pan-minjok*) road.¹⁸¹

Kang Chun-man, who is sometimes referred to as a “moderate,” as opposed to “progressive,” on the other hand is cautious against such judgements. Instead of mainly criticizing *Chosun ilbo*’s history, Kang rather draws attention to the role of the newspaper in creating and influencing historical memory.¹⁸²

Taking the memory of Syngman Rhee as an example, Kang laments a tendency to judge Rhee as either black or white, to either glorify or condemn his image. To Kang, such simplified memory raises caution, emphasizing the need to focus on newspapers and their role in the creation and revision of historical memory.¹⁸³ Kang evaluates the mid-1990s’ nostalgia for Park Chung-hee and conservative attempts at glorifying Syngman Rhee as a “PR success” of the establishment in trying to keep their influence over South Korean society.¹⁸⁴ Over-focusing on the successful economic development in historical memory, Kang argues, helped keep the political corruption and other negative aspects originating in the Park Chung-hee era outside of the historical consciousness of most South Koreans. This, he emphasizes, was also a responsibility of academics who had failed to gain influence over the broader public.¹⁸⁵ In regard to *Chosun ilbo* as a *ch’inilp’a* paper, activists tend to fall into a discursive trap, simplifying historical development

through the lens of the present, driven by agendas focused on domestic affairs. This is perhaps most visible in the repeated and harsh critique of *Chosun ilbo* as a pro-Japanese newspaper, especially during the war years. Between 1937 and 1940, before being discontinued in August 1940, the newspaper had printed portraits of the Japanese Emperor for New Year and had the Japanese flag atop its head. Whereas activists use this as proof for the treacherous nature of the paper in Korean history,¹⁸⁶ historical scholarship requires a subtler evaluation of this period. After the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 1937, the start of an eight-year long war and an increasing militarization of Japanese society, one may critically ask if, as a newspaper in a colony, *Chosun ilbo* had any realistic choice if it wanted to continue publishing. And that, while *Chosun ilbo*'s role in post-liberation anti-communist South Korea is a legitimate subject for critique, *Chosun ilbo* during the colonial period must be also evaluated as a newspaper that had helped to spread the Korean vernacular at a time when Korean was degraded to a second-class language.

Concerning *Chosun ilbo*'s past during the 1970s and 1980s, problem awareness following the Anti-Chosun Federation's establishment in 2000 is strikingly similar to the points outlined in Kang's 1992 essay introduced above. For example, Kim Tong-min highlights the salutatory editorials published in the newspaper on 18



Figure 10 A scene from the (first) Civic Trial against *Chosun ilbo*'s anti-ethnic and anti-unification actions, organized by a committee including key figures of the ACF and Mulch'ong, 30 January 2002, Seoul Press Center, 20 F. *Ohmynews*, 15 October 2004.

October 1972, following the proclamation of the Yushin constitution, in which *Chosun ilbo* welcomes the reform as “just the right measure at just the right time ... for improving the democratic system.”¹⁸⁷ What differs from Kang’s problem awareness in 1992 was that, by 2000, the thirty years of military dictatorship had been connected to the *ch’inilp’a* discourse, with hopes by Kim and others of the ACF to make *Chosun ilbo* repent for its past in this context.¹⁸⁸

The same must be said for the third issue that directed the attention of Anti-Chosun activists, the Kwangju Massacre and *Chosun ilbo*’s role in it. Kwangju received much more attention by activists than the 1960s and 1970s. While the 1950s to 1970s remained, for most Koreans in the late 1990s and early 2000s, a rather distant past, the events of May 1980 and its aftermath were central to not just intellectuals and other former student activists, but were at the core of a post-authoritarian consciousness.¹⁸⁹ For the progressive camp, Kwangju constitutes a formative moment. A series of articles idolizing Chun Doo-hwan in the months following Kwangju were used by activists to highlight *Chosun ilbo*’s close relationship with power during the 1980s: the first was an article titled “Chun Doo-hwan, the human” from 23 August 1980, painting a picture of a man who “put public before private.”¹⁹⁰ The second was an article from a week later, on 28 August, when *Chosun ilbo* hailed Chun’s election to president as the “beginning of a new era” and, for the next years, remained in a close relationship with the Chun regime.¹⁹¹ The *Chosun ilbo* articles concerning Kwangju and the rise to power by Chun, for Kim Tong-min, were “not even journalistic articles. They are highly agitating essays full of distortions,” which continued throughout the 1980s.¹⁹² As Kang previously argued, and activists repeated time and again, *Chosun ilbo*’s rise in the 1980s is hard to imagine without this currying of favor from Chun and his regime.

Throughout the period covered in this article, from the Ch’oe Chang-jip Incident (1998) to the election of Roh Moo-hyun (2002), historical memory constituted a central place within the Anti-Chosun discourse. Kim emphasizes that in the context of an on-going process of historical truth and reconciliation, “the tragedy of Korean contemporary history is the fact that we were never able to interrupt and settle a wrong course of history,”¹⁹³ revealing a strong continuity with minjung historical views of the 1970s and 1980s.¹⁹⁴ Anti-Chosun, as a movement to settle past affairs and shed light on the past, can be thus solidly placed within the epistemological framework of transitional justice from below. This was most visible in the staging of two civic tribunals in January 2002 and October 2004. The tribunals, which were purely symbolic from a judicial point of view, were organized by a joint committee involving members of the ACF, the CCDM, and O Han-hŭng from Okch’ŏn. In the first tribunal, which was set up as a spiritual successor to the 1948–1949 *ch’inilp’a*

commission, *Chosun ilbo* was accused of being, through its collaboration with the ruling elite, “anti-national” (*pan-minjok*) and “anti-unification” (*pan-t’ongil*) in the period of colonial rule, under the Park and Chun regimes, and into post-authoritarian South Korea after 1987.¹⁹⁵ At the trial, *Chosun ilbo* was accused of, among other points, “destroying the constitutional order,”¹⁹⁶ and, through its reporting in the spring and summer of 1980, preventing the spread of democracy and sabotaging, in a malicious way, those who were fighting for democratization and unification.¹⁹⁷ As with most of the Anti-Chosun Movement, the *ch’inilp’a*-card was prominent, with activists connecting past collaboration to recent, pro-US flunkeyism, such as the unequivocal support of the US through *Chosun ilbo* in the wake of 9.11, or the newspaper’s stance on US troop withdrawal.¹⁹⁸ Although the trials had no legal implications for *Chosun ilbo*, the indictments present the most extensive collection of problematic articles to date. With the materials of the first trial released as a book in April 2002, we can conclude that the trial was influential in further sensitizing progressives for the issue and providing activists with material for their activities.

Concluding remarks

In 2010, *Chosun ilbo* remained the leading newspaper on the South Korean market.¹⁹⁹ Although absolute numbers for subscriptions to the newspaper have been going down since 2010, proportions remain largely unchanged to the present day. This demonstrates that, speaking in absolute numbers, the Anti-Chosun Movement can hardly be considered a success. However, it is unclear how much these numbers actually tell us about influence. In February 2021, the Korea Audit Bureau of Circulation came under investigation by the authorities for exaggerating circulation numbers by as much as double, a measure that would ultimately benefit the three big conglomerates.²⁰⁰

Taken together, Anti-Chosun as a discourse and a movement was significant in that its rhetoric and goals represent a quintessence of progressive discourse in late-1990s and early-2000s’ South Korea. Progressives came to perceive *Chosun ilbo* not just as a newspaper closely connected to past military dictatorships, but as the central mouthpiece of the ancient regime, the *ch’inilp’a*. As such, *Chosun ilbo* and its history formed the archetype for an anti-national and anti-unification newspaper in the perception of progressives. Ultimately, Anti-Chosun hardened already existing rifts between conservatives and progressives, eventually turning from mere intellectual disputes into outright history “wars” by the next decade. The development of Anti-Chosun, as the first major movement organized online, laid the framework for protests and civic activism in the decade to come. Between 2000 and 2002, online journalism remained mostly progressive, but it was not long

before right-wing outlets like *Dailian* or *NewDaily* were established, reflecting the extension of social polarization into the realm of online journalism.

How does *Chosun ilbo* remember Anti-Chosun? In a self-published centennial history from 2020, Anti-Chosun is mentioned twice: once in connection to a 2001 tax survey and once in connection to Roh Moo-hyun. Neither the Ch'oe Incident, nor any of the defamation lawsuits or other developments are mentioned. Instead, the company's official history paints Anti-Chosun as a group of extremists intent on "suppressing the press," highlighting instead that the movement gave birth to a number of "pro-Chosun" groups.²⁰¹

Although the present study aimed to reconstruct the origins and overall development of the Anti-Chosun discourse and its transformation into a civic movement through a historical lens, further research on the subject remains to be done. More detailed studies on each of the different stages of the movement should be written and further materials, e.g., court documents and oral testimonies, need to be uncovered.

Abbreviations and acronyms

ACF	Anti-Chosun Federation	조선일보반대시민연대
CCDM	Citizens Council for Democratic Media	민주언론시민연합
Chojungdong	<i>Chosun ilbo</i> , <i>Chungang ilbo</i> , <i>Tonga ilbo</i>	조중동
GECS	2000 General Election Citizen's Federation	2000 년총선시민연대
GNP	Grand National Party	한나라당 (1997.11–2012.2)
Insamo	Assembly of Those who Love <i>Inmul kwa sasang</i>	인물과사상을 사랑하는 사람의 모임
Inmul	<i>Inmul kwa sasang</i>	
Joase (Choase)	A Beautiful World Without Chosun <i>ilbo</i>	조선일보없는 아름다운 세상
KBS	Korea Broadcasting Station	
MDP	Millennium Democratic Party	새천년민주당 (2000.1–2005.5)
Nosamo	Assembly of Those who Love Roh Moo-hyun	노무현을 사랑하는 사람의 모임
NSL	National Security Law	

PSPD	People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy	참여연대
ROK	Republic of Korea	

Important actors

Chin Chung-gwŏn	Journalist, <i>Mal</i> , later <i>Ohmynews</i>
Chong Chi-hwan	Journalist, <i>Mal</i>
Ch'oe Chang-jip	Political scientist
Hong Se-hwa	Columnist, <i>Hankyoreh</i>
Hwang Sŏk-yŏng	Author, formerly imprisoned on charges of the NSL
Im Hyŏn-gu	Chairman of Choase
Kang Chun-man	Professor, media studies; essayist and editor of <i>Inmul kwa sasang</i> ; writer
Kim Tae-jung	Chief editor, <i>Chosun ilbo</i>
Kim Tong-min	Professor, media studies; chairman of ACF, CCDM member
Myŏng Kye-nam	Actor; chairman of Nosamo
O Han-hŭng	Editor, <i>Okch'ŏn sinmun</i>
Yi Han-u	Journalist, <i>Chosun ilbo</i> , focus on historical memory

Chronology

Period	Key Actors / Organizations	Classification	Major Issue(s)
1992–	Kang Chun-man / <i>Inmul kwa sasang</i>	intellectual	media reform
1999–	Urimodu	Online	media reform, historical memory
2000–	Anti-Chosun Federation / CCDM	intellectual, education	media reform, historical memory
2000–	O Han-hŭng / Mulch'ong	regional, local media	historical memory, esp. <i>ch'inilp'a</i>
2002–	Nosamo (Roh Moo-hyun)	Political	media reform, <i>ch'inilp'a</i>
2002–	Choase	mass movement	historical memory, <i>ch'inilp'a</i>

Notes

1. PhD Student, Department of Contemporary History, Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University, E-Mail: vierthaler.patrick.54z@st.kyoto-u.ac.jp.

2. This paper presents a revised version of a manuscript included in the proceedings of the 8th Annual Korea University Graduate Students Conference, held on 28 May 2021 in Seoul, South Korea. The research carried out for this article was supported by a Korea Foundation Fellowship for Graduate Studies in Japan, April 2021–August 2021, and a scholarship from the Honjo International Scholarship Foundation, September–October 2021. Furthermore, I would like to offer my sincere gratitude to Daria E. Grishina from the Academy of Korean Studies, who proved irreplaceable during the COVID-19 pandemic in repeatedly helping me to acquire all the necessary primary and secondary sources for the present research from Korea, something which would otherwise have been impossible due to ongoing COVID-19-related travel restrictions.
3. Kim Mikyoung, ed. *Korean Memories and Psycho-Historical Fragmentation* (London: Routledge, 2019).
4. Kim Chông-in, *Yöksa chônjaeng: kwagõ rül haesök hanün ssaum* (Seoul: Chaeksang, 2016).
5. In previously published articles, the author has suggested the methodological framework of approaching South Korea's mnemonic divide through the lens of mnemohistory. With the conservative establishment as a central pillar of Korean society, I avoid simplifications of "revisionists" against "historians" as commonly seen within South Korean discourse, as both major parties conduct deliberate acts of "forgetting" in their quest for hegemony regarding Korean history from 1945–1953. Rather, I aim towards writing a "social history of remembering" (Peter Burke) by focusing on "contested Cultural memories" (Aleida Assmann) in a dynamic process of "remembering" and "forgetting" (Aleida Assmann) within "memory cultures" (Astrid Erll). In this framework, politics, mass media, civic activism, and historical scholarship all constitute individual realms within a larger "memory community." Cf. Patrick Vierthaler, "1948 as Division or Foundation? The New Right Movement and South Korean Cultural Memory: A Mnemohistorical Approach," Essay published as part of a carousel lecture series "Between Nostalgia and Nausea: Attitudes towards the Past in Contemporary Korea," SEED Olomouc (2020): 1–3. <http://seed.upol.cz/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Patrick-Vierthaler-ESSAY.pdf>; Patrick Vierthaler, "The New Right and the 1948 Foundation View: A Failed Revision of South Korean Cultural Memory," *Vienna Journal of East Asian Studies* 13 (2021): 20–26.
6. Kim Chông-in's above-quoted *Yöksa chônjaeng* stands exemplary for connecting the "history wars" to the New Right movement in Korean. In Western scholarship, too, this tendency is visible. Cf. Myungji Yang, "The Specter of the Past: Reconstructing Conservative Historical Memory in South Korea," *Politics & Society* 49.3 (2021): 348–351. Furthermore, recent studies on conservative historical consciousness and disputed historical memories tend to place a focus on the 1980s left-wing student movement and the "New Right" as a backlash to this. Cf. Sungik Yang, "An Old Right in New Bottles: State Without Nation in South Korean New Right Historiography," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 80.4 (2021): 897–898.
7. For detailed studies on the New Right movement and its institutionalization, cf. Patrick Vierthaler, "A Reconsideration of the New Right's Formative Period (2003–2008): Conservative Experiences, Mass Media and Cultural Memory in Post-Authoritarian South Korea," *European Journal of Korean Studies* 20.1 (2020): 35–84; and Vladimir Tikhonov (Pak No-ja), "The Rise and Fall of the New Right Movement and the Historical Wars in 2000s South Korea," *European Journal of Korean Studies* 18.2 (2019): 5–36.
8. These continuities have been vividly elaborated by Korean political scientists and essayists. In 2002, Ch'oe Chang-jip's monograph *Mínjuhwa ihu üi minjujuüi* (Democracy after democratization) critically dissected the nature of the South Korean political system after 1987. For Ch'oe and other observers, democratization was, and remains, a process, rather than a singular watershed moment. This helps explain an on-going anxiety of progressives, as the successors to the democratization movement, in their political struggles with conservatives, as the successors to the former ruling elite, throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Cf.

- Ch'oe Chang-jip. *Minjuhwa ihu ūi minjujuūi* (Seoul: Humanitas, 2002), revised and extended editions were released in 2005 and 2013.
9. The terms “1987 System” (*87-nyŏn ch'eje*) or “1997 System” (*97-nyŏn ch'eje*) emerged to define the distinctions, but also continuities to the authoritarian period, the “1948 System” (*48-nyŏn ch'eje*). E.g. Kim Chong-yŏp, ed. *87-nyŏn ch'ejeron* (Seoul: Changbi, 2009).
 10. On regionalism and its legacy, cf. e.g. Keedon Kwon, “Regionalism in South Korea: Its Origins and Role in Her Democratization,” *Politics & Society* 32.4 (2004): 555–566. Cf. also Ch'oe, *Minjuhwa ihu*, pp. XX.
 11. A detailed historical study on the development of the Jeju April 3 Incident can be found in John Merrill, “The Cheju-do Rebellion,” *Journal of Korean Studies* 2 (1980): 139–197. On the subsequent process of historical fact-finding and truth and reconciliation, cf. Hun Joon Kim. *The Massacred at Mt. Halla: Sixty Years of Truth Seeking in South Korea* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014).
 12. On the Kwangju Uprising and its impact on South Korean society, cf. Gi-Wook Shin and Kyung Moon Hwang, eds. *Contentious Kwangju: The May 18 Uprising in Korea's Past and Present* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).
 13. Illustrating this polarization within media is, for example in the realm of historical memory, reporting surrounding the so-called Foundation Day Dispute of 2008. Cf. Patrick Vierthaler. “How to Place August 15 in South Korean History? The New Right, the ‘1948 Foundation’ Historical View and the 2008 Kŏn'gukchŏl Dispute,” *Vienna Journal of East Asian Studies* 10 (2018): 160–165.
 14. This process is described in detail in Kim Dong-Choon, “The Long Road Toward Truth and Reconciliation: Unwavering Attempts to Achieve Justice in South Korea,” *Critical Asian Studies* 42.4 (2010): 525–552. The context necessary for reconciliation, in the case study of historical fact-finding regarding the Jeju April 3 Incident, is dealt with in: Ja-hyun Chun and Jung-Sun Han, “Delayed Reconciliation and Transitional Justice in Korea: Three Levels of Conditions for National Reconciliation,” *Asian Journal of Social Science* 45 (2017): 294–315.
 15. An overview over the historiography of the Korean War, with a particular focus on the 1990s, can be found in Wada Haruki, *The Korean War. An International History* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016): xviii–xxvii.
 16. Song Yoonjae defines *ch'inilp'a* (친일파 親日派) as “contain(ing) a strong moral judgment. The notion holds a meaning of not only an anti-national traitor, but it is also used to describe an individual as a self-seeking, opportunistic, and immoral traitor of the nation. Since the late 1970s, many progressive intellectuals associated the notion not only with anti-nation, but also anti-democracy and anti-minjung (the oppressed common people of Korea who constitute the genuine national subject).” In addition, Song adds, “(m)ost recently, it tends to refer to someone who is not in line with progressive political line or who is politically conservative/reactionary.” Source: Yoonjae Song. “Contextualizing the Discourse on Pro-Japanese Collaborators in the Process of Democratization after Democracy,” *The Review of Korean Studies* 18.1 (2015): 197.
 17. This discourse, Song writes, “(...) indicates a unique historical narrative of the progressives that explains the reciprocity between the unpunished *ch'inilp'a* and the unfolding of post-1945 S. Korean history. According to the narrative, unpurged collaborators came back to the public sphere after the dissolution of the Special Committee to Judge Anti-national Crimes and continued to rule the society in cooperation with authoritarian regimes and the US. Their very existence and success damaged the historical legitimacy of the newly born nation-state, the national spirit (*minjok chŏnggŏ*), and a sense of social justice among Koreans. Furthermore, their support for post-1945 dictators resulted in the repeated failures of democracy in the forms of prolonged dictatorship, military coups, and massacre.” Source: Song, “Contextualizing,” pp. 196–197.

18. For progressives, peaceful unification stayed the historical task of the Korean people, and co-operation with the North was a means to achieve it. For conservatives, in lieu of a military threat, “democratization” of the North in the Zeitgeist of liberal democracy replaced forceful unification as a realist solution, with toppling, not supporting, the Kim regime as opposed to perceivingly idealist or naïve progressive ideals.
19. In 1990, Kim Yŏng-sam joined forces with Roh Tae-woo, in the so-called three party merger (*samdang hapdang*), that became the spiritual ancestor of the later Grand National Party, the main conservative party from 1997 to 2012. In 1998, Kim Dae-jung, in order to secure a majority, too, signed a pact with Kim Chong-pil, the former number two under Park Chung-hee, in the so-called DJP-alliance (*DJP-yŏnhap*) Throughout the 1990s, former democracy activists were, in the context of realpolitik, forced to co-operate with the former ruling establishment.
20. The author deducts this from a look at sales-figures in the category of books on modern and contemporary history in the 1990s and 2000s. Throughout the 1990s, highly progressive treatments of Korean history, by authors such as Pak Se-gil or Kang Man-gil were the top sellers within this category.
21. Cf. Dal Yong Jin, “How to Understand Digital Korea.” In Youna Kim, ed. *Routledge Handbook of Korean Culture and Society* (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 179–192; Ki-Sung Kwak, “Digital Media and Democratic Transition in Korea.” In Youna Kim, ed. *Routledge Handbook of Korean Culture and Society* (London: Routledge, 2017), pp. 218–230; and Eun-mee Kim. “Digital Media and the Rise of Connected Individuals in Korea.” In Youna Kim, ed. *Routledge Handbook of Korean Culture and Society* (London: Routledge, 2016): 231–242.
22. On the establishment of *Ohmynews*, the first and most prominent outlet of online “citizen’s journalism,” established by Oh Yŏn-ho, a former journalist of the monthly *Mal*, cf. Jennifer Veale. “Seoul Searching,” *Foreign Policy* (January/February 2007): 94–96, and Kwak, “Digital Media,” 2017, pp. 220–222.
23. Cf. Hang Shin Eui, “Presidential Elections, Internet Politics, and Citizens Organizations in South Korea,” *Journal of Asian Sociology* 34:1 (2005): 39–45; or Chung, Jongpil, “Comparing Online Activities in China and South Korea: The Internet and the Political Regime,” *Asian Survey* 48:5 (2008): 748–750.
24. E.g. Namhee Lee, *The Making of Minjung: Democracy and the Politics of Representation in South Korea* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007).
25. E.g. Jiyeon Kang, *Igniting the Internet: Youth and Activism in Postauthoritarian South Korea* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2016) or Andrew Eungi Kim, “Civic activism and Korean democracy: the impact of blacklisting campaigns in the 2000 and 2004 general elections,” *The Pacific Review* 19.4 (2006): 519–542.
26. Cf. e.g. Kim, *Yŏksa chŏnjaeng*, 2016.
27. In 2008, New Right scholars gained influence in the Lee Myung-bak administration’s official commemorations. That year, commemorations for August 15, the day marking both the liberation from colonial rule (1945) as well as the ROK’s establishment (1948), were held solely focussing on the later, angering progressives, for whom the ROK primarily represents a political division of the peninsula. Cf. Vierthaler, “How to Place,” pp. 137–174.
28. One outcome of the 2008 commemorations was the construction of a National Museum of Contemporary History. Planned and finished in only four years, the final museum reflected New Right historical consciousness in its exhibition, and was heavily criticized by progressive intellectuals. Cf. Yi Tong-gi and Hong Sŏk-ryul, “‘Taehan Min’guk Yŏksa Pangmulgwan’ saŏp pip’an kwa chŏngch’aek tae’an,” *Yŏksa Pip’yŏng* 99 (2012): 284–313.
29. The perhaps most well-known example of this was the trial surrounding Park Yu-ha and her book on comfort women. As the result of a defamation lawsuit, Park was forced to censor parts of her (highly disputed) book. Cf. Rumi Sakamoto, Kitahara Minoru, and Kim Puja, “The Flawed Japan-ROK Attempt to Resolve the Controversy Over Wartime Sexual

- Slavery and the Case of Park Yuha,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal Japan Focus* 14:5 (2016), no. 2. <https://apjpf.org/2016/05/Kitahara.html> (accessed 15 October 2021).
30. E.g. Kim Tong-min, “Ant’i chosŏn simin undong ūi yŏksajŏk ūimi.” In Chosŏn Ilbo Pandae Simin Yŏndae, ed. *Wae? Chosŏn ilbo inga* (Seoul: Inmul kwa sasang-sa, 2000), pp. 13–37; “Chaengjŏm 1: ant’i chosŏn 2-nyŏn, chindan kwa mosaek,” *Sahoe pip’yŏng* 34 (2002.12): 12–40.
 31. Song Yeun-Jee, “Historicizing the Discourse on Pro-Japanese Collaborators in Contemporary Korea from the Late 1970s to the Late 2000s,” PhD thesis (University of California Los Angeles, 2013): 90 and 93–97.
 32. Han Yun-hyŏng, *Ant’i chosŏn undongsa* (Seoul: T’eksŭt’ŭ, 2010).
 33. For matters of readability, I use *Chosun ilbo* and *Chosun* interchangeably to refer to *Chosun ilbo*.
 34. In present-day South Korea, Kang is well-known as a writer of public history books. His 23-volume *Han’guk hyŏndaesa sanch’aek* (A stroll of Korean contemporary history, 2002–2011) series was a steady best-seller for much of the 2000s and 2010s, far outselling most of the academic works on contemporary history (on e-sellers Aladin and Kyobo Books). Kang is known as an energetic writer, having published multiple books each year since the mid-1990s.
 35. Kang Chun-man’s PhD thesis was on the relationship between journalism and politics in Reagan’s US. Cf. Kang Chun-man, *Taet’ongnyŏng kwa yŏron chojak: Ronaldŭ Reigŏn ūi imiji chŏngch’i* (Seoul: T’aeam), 1989.
 36. This stream of thought is characteristic for his early writings, which are included in: Kang Chun-man, *Han’guk ŏllon kwa yŏron chojak* (Seoul: Iron kwa silch’ŏn, 1992); Kang Chun-man, *Han’guk ŏllon kwa yŏron chojak* (Seoul: Iron kwa silch’ŏn, 1992); and Kang Chun-man, *Őllon ūn k’amelleon inga* (Seoul: Konggan), 1993.
 37. Kang Chun-man, *Kim Tae-jung chugigi* (Seoul: Kaema kowŏn 개마고원, 1995). The same year, *Chosun ilbo* (together with the Samsung-owned *Joongang ilbo*), undertook massive efforts to “re-evaluate” Syngman Rhee, South Korea’s first president (1948–60) who ruled the country autocratically in the 1950s, as the ROK’s “founding father,” triggering in itself a mnemonic dispute. Cf. Patrick Vierthaler, “Founding Father or Traitor to the Nation? Contested Memories of Syngman Rhee in Mid-1990s South Korea,” forthcoming.
 38. Kang, *Kim Tae-jung*, 1995, p. 33.
 39. Kang, *Kim Tae-jung*, 1995, pp. 34–35.
 40. Pang Ŭng-mo (方應謨, 1883–1950), who joined *Chosun ilbo* in 1932, served as president of the company from 1933 until his death in 1950—an formally remained publisher until 1979. Following his death, his nephews and adopted sons Pang Il-yŏng (方一榮, 1923–2003) and Pang U-yŏng (方又榮, 1928–2016) were to take on important roles in the company. Pang Il-yŏng became representative director in 1954. From 1964 until 1993, Pang Il-yŏng was chairman (회장 *hoejang*), Pang U-yŏng president (사장 *sajang*) of the company (as well as CEO, 대표이사 *daep’yo isa*, from 1964–1970). In 1993, Pang Il-yŏng’s son Pang Sang-hun (方相勳, 1948–) took over as president, a post in which remains in until the present day. Pang Il-yŏng took over the role of chairman, staying in the post until 2003. Due to his power as president of one of South Korea’s most powerful media conglomerates, Pang U-yŏng was nicknamed “shadow president” (*pam ūi daet’ongnyŏng*).
 41. Kang, *Kim Tae-jung*, 1995, pp. 32–33.
 42. Kang Chun-man, *Chosŏn ilbo konghwaguk* (Seoul: Inmul kwa Sasang-sa, 1999), p. 202.
 43. Kang et al., *Chosŏn ilbo konghwaguk*, 1999, pp. 196–198.
 44. Kang et al., *Chosŏn ilbo konghwaguk*, 1999, pp. 196–198.
 45. Kang et al., *Chosŏn ilbo konghwaguk*, 1999, pp. 196–198.
 46. Kang et al., *Chosŏn ilbo konghwaguk*, 1999, p. 199.
 47. Kang et al., *Chosŏn ilbo konghwaguk*, 1999, pp. 195–196.

48. Kim Tae-jung (金大中, 1939–)—not to be confused with the later president of the same name, who for matters of clarity shall be romanized as Kim Dae-jung in this paper—served as opinion chief editor (논설위원 *nonsŏl wiwŏn*) from 1988–1989, and as chief editor (주필 *chupil*) of *Chosun ilbo* from 1990–2002. Having entered the company in 1965, Kim was important in the shift of *Chosun* to the right, which became the focus of Anti-Chosun activists discussed in this paper. In 1998–99, Kang’s writings openly attacked Kim’s columns.
49. Ryu Kŭn-il (柳根一, 1938–), a former political dissident during the Syngman Rhee period, became one of the newspapers most well-known editorialists in the 1990s and early 2000s, and, later, in the mid-2000s, a vocal advocate for the New Right movement. He served as head editorial writer from 1989–1996, opinion chief-editor from 1996–2002, and as chief editor from 2002–2004. Cf. Vierthaler, “A Reconsideration,” 2020: 51.
50. “‘Ije nŭn mal handa’ pangsong kongsa chŏt kohae sŏngsa (‘이제는 말한다’ 방송공사 첫 고해성사 ‘Now we can say it’: the broadcasting corporation’s first confession),” *Hankyoreh*, 21 April 1998.
51. “Ije,” *Hankyoreh*, 21 April 1998.
52. “Kaehyŏk rip’ot’ ū kat’ ūn ppopannŭnde... (개혁리포트 같은 뽑았는데... Picking the same reform report, but...),” *Hankyoreh*, 8 September 1998.
53. “Ilbu naeyong ohae issŏ pallon podo yoch’ŏng (일부 내용 오해 있어 반론보도 요청 Requesting a correction due to factual errors),” *Tonga ilbo*, 11 October 1998; “Pangsong sŏngjŏng kyŏngjaeng wiŏm suwi ch’ongpung tŭng p’yŏnp’a podo sim hada (방송 煽情 경쟁 위험수위 統風 등 편파보도 심하다 Severely biased reporting due to dangerous competition in TV),” *Chosŏn ilbo*, 3 November 1998.
54. Park Myung-lim, in his study on the historiography and memory of the Korean War, evaluates Ch’oe as a significant scholar who helped to bring new perspectives into Korean War historiography in the later 1980s and early 1990s, and who helped to foster interdisciplinary research whilst remaining a distance from both orthodox and revisionist interpretations of the War. Cf. Park Myung-lim = Pak Myŏng-lim, *Yŏksa wa chisik kwa sahoe: han’guk chŏnjaeng ihae wa han’guk sahoe* (Seoul: Nanam, 2011): 120–128.
55. U Chong-ch’ang, “‘6.25 nŭn Kim Il-sŏng ūi yŏksajŏg kyŏldan’: ‘che-2 ūi kŏn’guk’ ch’uchin kwa tŏburŏ chumok toenŭn Choe Chang-jip ūi han’guk hyŏndaesa sigak,” *Wŏlgan chosŏn* (1998.11): 206–222.
56. Lee Han-u (1961–) is a journalist at *Chosun ilbo*, who joined the paper in 1994. With a PhD from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in philosophy, Yi had translated a number of books before starting to work as a journalist. In 1995, he was authoring an extensive series on Syngman Rhee. Cf.: Yi Han-u, “Hyŏndaesa chae-palgyŏn, ‘han’guk taet’ŏngnyŏng’ sirijŭ: Kŏdae-han saengae Yi Sŭng-man 90-nyŏn (현대사(現代史)재발견「한국대통령」시리즈 거대한 생애 이승만(李承晩) 90년 Re-discovering contemporary history, series on the ‘Korean president’: 90 years Syngman Rhee’s great life),” 65 instalments, *Chosŏn ilbo*, 1 January–26 December 1995; in 1998, he took a central role in a *Chosun*-sponsored exhibition on Syngman Rhee as the “father of the nation.” Cf. Vierthaler, “Founding Father or,” 2022, forthcoming.
57. “Han’guk chŏnjaeng kwallyŏn Choe Chang-jip wiwŏnjang nonmun palch’oe: migun kwa han’gukkun ūi 38-sŏn tolpa ‘konggyŏkchŏk p’aengch’anguju ūi pallo’ (한국전쟁 관련 崔章集위원장 논문 발췌: 美軍과 한국군의 38선 돌파 ‘공격적 팽창주의의 발로’ An extract from a paper by chief commissioner Ch’oe Chang-jip in regards to the Korean War: the crossing of the 38th parallel by US and Korean troops as a ‘step of aggressive expansionism’),” *Chosŏn ilbo*, 26 October 1998; “Choe Chang-jip wiwŏnjang 6.25-gwan podo kwallyŏn chaeya, Chosŏn ilbo sŏngt’o (崔章集위원장 6.25觀 보도 관련 在野, 朝鮮日報 성토 The opposition examining *Chosun ilbo* in relation to its reporting on Ch’oe Chang-jip’s views on June 25),” *Chosŏn ilbo*, 3 November 1998; “Chosŏn ilbo chugigi (조선일보 죽이기 The *Chosun ilbo* witch-hunt),” *Chosŏn ilbo*, 4 November 1998, p. 2.

58. On 4 November 1998, a number of further articles and opinion pieces on were prominently placed in the newspaper, with the headline “Ch’oe Chang-jip’s historical views damaging the ROK’s legitimacy” in big, bold letters on a related article on the same page as Yi’s column. Cf. “‘Ch’oe Chang-jip wiwŏnjang yŏksagwan, taehanmin’guk hweson’ (‘최장집위원장 역사관, 대한민국 전통선 훼손’ “High commissioner Ch’oe Chang-jip’s historical views damaging the ROK’s legitimacy”),” *Chosŏn ilbo*, 4 November 1998, p. 2.
59. E.g. “Taet’ongnyŏng chamun haeksim kongin ..kŏmjŭng mattang (대통령 자문 핵심공인 (公人)……검증 마땅 It is appropriate to examine (the)... key presidential advisor),” *Chosŏn ilbo*, 24 October 1998.
60. “Choe Chang-jip kyosu ‘han’guksa yŏn’gu waegok podo’ Wŏlgan Chosŏn e 5-ŏk sonbaeso (최장집교수 ‘한국사연구 왜곡보도’ 월간조선에 5억 손배소 “Distorted reporting of Korean history”: Ch’oe Chang-jip suing Wŏlgan Chosŏn for a compensation of 500 million),” *Hankyoreh*, 23 October 1998; “Chosŏn ilbosa chinbo insa konggyŏk kwagŏ sarye (조선일보사 진보인사 공격 과거사례 Past examples of attacks by *Chosun ilbo* on progressives),” *Hankyoreh*, 23 October 1998.
61. “Choe Chang-jip kyosu nonmun ‘woegok podo’ Wŏlgan Chosŏn 11-wŏlho: pŏbwŏn, p’anmae kŭmji kach’yŏbun kyŏljŏng (최장집교수 논문 ‘왜곡보도’ 월간조선 11월호: 법원, 판매금지 가져분 결정 The Ch’oe Chang-jip “distorted reporting” paper: court sentence to stop the selling of *Wŏlgan Chosŏn*’s November issue),” *Hankyoreh*, 12 November 1998 (title page).
62. “Choe Chang-jip kyosu sasang nonjaeng ‘ponghap’ (최장집교수 사상논쟁·봉합’ The Ch’oe Chang-jip controversy has been stitched-up),” *Hankyoreh*, 19 January 1999; “Choe Chang-jip kyosu sosong chwŏha (최장집교수 소송 취하 Ch’oe Chang-jip withdrawing his lawsuit),” *Hankyoreh*, 20 January 1999.
63. While Kang’s activities can be traced back as far as 1992 (cf. above), *Mal*’s Chosun-critical stance—although technically dating back to its establishment as a progressive journal committed to further democratization and reform of the media in the mid-1980s—was an outcome of the 1998 KBS documentary controversy (cf. above). From June 1998 to March 2000, a “newspaper monitor division” of the CDM (cf. below) began focusing its writings on *Chosun ilbo* in a series titled “The press must stand upright in order for the country to be alive.” Articles in this series focused on current affairs as well as they did on *Chosun*’s history, e.g. an instalment on the close relationship between *Chosun ilbo* and Chun Doo-hwan from October 1998. Cf. Minju Ŏllon Undong Simin Yŏnhap Sinmun Monit’ŏ Pungwa. “Chosŏn ilbo ũi Chŏn Tu-hwan podo kisa nŭn ‘hyŏndaep’an yongbiŏch’ŏn-ga’,” *Wŏlgan mal* (1998.10): pp. 132–137.
64. P’yŏnjippu, “Kija rŭl sabyŏnghwa han *Chosŏn ilbo*,” *Inmul kwa sasang* (1998.12): 61–63.
65. P’yŏnjippu, “Kija,” p. 64–65.
66. P’yŏnjippu, “Kija,” p. 69.
67. P’yŏnjippu, “Kija,” p. 64.
68. Chŏng Chi-hwan, “‘Chinbo insa chugigi’: ppuri nŭn ch’inil k’omp’ŭlleksŭ,” *Wŏlgan mal* (1998.12): 96–97.
69. The publisher of *Inmul kwa sasang*.
70. “Chosŏn ilbo kija ‘mal’ ‘inmul kwa sasang’ e sonbaeso (조선일보 기자 ‘말’ ‘인물과 사상’에 손배소),” *Tonga ilbo*, 1 December 1998. Furthermore, on 11 December, Cho Gap-je (Cho Kap-je) at that time the chief editor of *Wŏlgan Chosŏn*, too, filed a lawsuit against *Mal*, demanding five-hundred million Won in compensation.
71. Reporting on the Ch’oe Incident centered primarily on *Chosun ilbo* and *Hankyoreh*. Between 21 October and 1 December 1998, a total number of 139 articles mentioning Ch’oe Chang-jip were published in *Chosun ilbo*, as opposed to 119 articles in *Hankyoreh*, *Tonga ilbo*, on the other hand, only published 40 articles, *Kyŏnggyang sinmun* 20. Reporting in both *Chosun ilbo* and *Hankyoreh* centered on 12–14 November. Data compiled by the author.

72. Kim Tong-min et al. *Chosŏn ilbo rŭl asinnikka?* (Seoul: Kaema kowŏn, 1999); Kang et al., *Chosŏn ilbo konghwaguk, 1999*.
73. “Chosŏn ilbo kongdaewi’ paljok (‘조선일보 공대위’ 발족 Establishment of the *Chosun ilbo* joint measures committee),” *Hankyoreh*, 20 November 1998. Unfortunately, to date, the author has not been able to find further material on this committee and its activities.
74. Kim Tong-min, “Uri nŭn wae Chosŏn ilbo rŭl kŏbu haeya hanŭnga,” *Chŏnŏllijŭm pip’yŏng* 31 (2000.9): 47.
75. Hong Hyŏn-sŏng, “Pan-Chosŏn ilbo undong ŭi chinjja ũimi,” *Inmul kwa sasang* (2000.9): 13.
76. For example, O Han-hŭng of the *Okch’ŏn sinmun*, a later central figure to the Anti-Chosun Movement (cf. further below), names a pamphlet by the Joint Measures Committee, *Chosŏn ilbo rŭl haebu handa* (Dissecting *Chosun ilbo*) as the reason for gaining an interest into the issue. Source: “Ŏllon paro seuryŏmyŏn Chosŏn ilbo pan-minjok haengwi kyumyŏng put’ŏ’ (‘언론 바로 세우려면 조선일보 반민족행위 규명부터’ “If we want to make decent media, we need to start with the investigation of *Chosun ilbo*”),” *Hankyoreh*, 23 March 2020. Unfortunately, due to COVID-19-related travel restriction, the author has not been able to gain a copy of this pamphlet yet.
77. In Chŏng’s case, the lawsuit against Yi would continue until 2003, when the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Chŏng and against *Chosun*. Cf. Chŏng Chi-hwan, “Myŏngye sosong 5-nyŏn chŏnjaeng’ kwa ‘Okch’ŏn chŏnt’u’ ũi ch’uŏk,” *Hwanghae munhwa* 50 (2006): 438.
78. Han, *Anti chosŏn*, 2010, p. 105.
79. Han, *Anti chosŏn*, 2010, p. 105.
80. The full dispute between Chin and Yi can be retrieved at: <http://www.urimodu.com/tell/movement.htm> (accessed via the Wayback Machine, 5 December 2000) by accessing pages 1–12 beneath “(인물과 사상 게시판에서 있었던 이한우 기자와 진중권님 및 네티즌 간의 최장집 사건 관련 논쟁입니다.)” at the bottom of the page).
81. This date is named as the establishment date at an ad published by Urimodu in *Hankyoreh*: “Chosŏn ilbo yŏ, na rŭl koso hara! (조선일보여, 나를 고소하라! Hey *Chosun ilbo*, sue me!),” *Hankyoreh*, 7 July 2000, p. 25 (full-page ad, not available online).
82. On the website itself, 9 January 2000 is listed as its creation date. The Urimodu bulletin board has its first entries on 5 January. It is likely that after 22 November, the website was built step-by-step, with 9 January marking the official starting point.
83. Han Yun-hyŏng argues that despite the site being rather small, over the next months, the nature of Urimodu users as “keyboard warriors” contributed significantly to the visibility of the *Chosun* issue. Han, *Anti chosŏn*, 2010, p. 118.
84. In a separate section, all Ch’oe Incident or *Chosun*-related posts from the *Inmul* bulletin board were copied to the new Urimodu site. Due to technical issues, however, all these entries are listed as “5 January 2000.” With the *Inmul* board inaccessible as of this day (October 2021), these 352 entries are the only available source from this period of time. Source: <http://urimodu.com/bbs1/bbs.cgi?db=history> (accessed via the Wayback Machine, 26 April 2001).
85. “Anti Chosun movement,” <http://urimodu.com/bbs1/bbs.cgi?db=history&mode=read&num=7&page=12&ftype=6&fval=&backdepth=1> (accessed via the Wayback Machine, 3 September 2001).
86. The National Front to Liberate South Korea was an underground, anti-Yusin opposition movement established in February 1976 with the goal to democratize and “liberate” South Korea (*nam-chosŏn*). On 9 and 16 October, the organization’s existence was made public by the Ministry of Interior, and until November, 84 members were arrested and charged under the NSL. Cf. “Nam-chosŏn minjok haebang chŏnsŏn sakkŏn,” *Encyclopedia of Korean Culture*. <http://encykorea.aks.ac.kr/Contents/Item/E0073400>.
87. “Na rŭl koso hara! (나를 고소하라! Sue me!),” *Hankyoreh*, 29 November 1999.

88. “Chosŏn ilbo yŏ,” *Hankyoreh*, 7 July 2000. The full page, in high resolution, can be accessed at <https://tinyurl.com/antichosun>.
89. See further below in the section on Roh Moo-hyun and Anti-Chosun.
90. “Chosŏn ilbo yŏ,” *Hankyoreh*, 7 July 2000.
91. “‘Chosŏn ilbo yŏ na rŭl koso hara’: Urimodu dat k’ŏm, 7-il 1748-myŏng sŏmyŏng tamŭn chŏnmyŏn kwanggo kejae (‘조선일보여 나를 고소하라’: 우리모두닷컴, 7일 1748명 서명 담은 전면 광고 게재 ‘Hey Chosun ilbo, sue me!’: urimodu.com publishing a full-page ad including on 1,748 signatures on the 7th),” *Ohmynews*, 9 July 2000.
92. “Ri Yŏng-hŭi kyosu, ‘ant’i-chosŏn’ e dongch’am: ant’i-chosŏn Urimodu ūi ‘na rŭl koso hara’ e Ri Yŏng-hŭi kyosu sŏmyŏng (리영희 교수, ‘안티 조선’에 동참: 안티조선 우리모두의 ‘나를 고소하라’에 리영희 교수 서명 Prof. Ri Yŏng-hŭi, participating in ‘Anti-Chosun’: Prof. Ri Yŏng-hŭi has signed Anti-Chosun Urimodu’s ‘Sue me!’),” *Ohmynews*, 15 July 2000.
93. “Sosŏlga Hwang Sŏk-yŏng ssi ‘eChosŏn ilbo wa nŭn int’ŏbyu sajŏl’ (소설가 황석영씨 ‘조선일보와는 인터뷰 사절’),” *Sŏul sinmun*, 7 June 2000.
94. “Chŏhangjŏk riŏllijŭm chakka Hwang Sŏk-yŏng int’ŏbyu (저항적 리얼리즘 작가 황석영 인터뷰),” *Chosŏn ilbo*, 18 May 2000.
95. “‘Tong’in munhaksang’ 1-ch’a simsa chakka 9-myŏng ūi 10-p’yŏn ppoba (‘동인문학상’ 1차심사 작가 9명의 10편 뽑아),” *Chosŏn ilbo*, 6 June 2000.
96. “(T’ŭkbyŏl kigo) Tong’in munhaksang hubojak ūl kŏbu handa ((특별기고) 동인문학상 후보작을 거부한다),” *Hankyoreh*, 19 July 2000.
97. “(T’ŭkbyŏl kigo) Tong’in,” *Hankyoreh*, 19 July 2000. Hwang’s rejection of *Chosun ilbo* was the start for a separate dispute on mass media’s influence over literature that would be known as the Literature Power Dispute (*munhak kwŏllyŏk nonjaeng*) later on.
98. Kim, “Ant’i chosŏn,” 2000, p. 14.
99. Kim, “Ant’i chosŏn,” 2000, p. 17.
100. Over the next months and years, *Ohmynews*, much more so than *Hankyoreh*, would emerge the central media outlet reporting on Anti-Chosun related issues. This was, as will be clear from the analysis further below, apparent in reporting on the local Anti-Chosun Movement in Okch’ŏn as much as it was in reporting on the activities of Joase.
101. Chosŏn ilbo kigo wa int’ŏbyu rŭl kŏbu hanŭn chisikin (조선일보 기고와 인터뷰를 거부하는 지식인 Intellectuals boycotting interviews and co-operation with Chosun ilbo, henceforth “Intellectuals”). “Chosŏn ilbo kigo wa int’ŏbyu rŭl kŏbu hanŭn chisikin 1-ch’a sŏn’ŏn: uri nŭn Chosŏn ilbo rŭl kŏbu hamnida (조선일보 기고와 인터뷰를 거부하는 지식인 1차 선언: 우리는 조선일보를 거부합니다),” *Inmul kwa sasang* (2000.9): 7.
102. “In particular, we are paying attention to *Chosun ilbo*, a reactionary newspaper loved by the establishment, that is not merely opposing any (media) reform, but openly in favor of military unification.” Source: Intellectuals, “Chosŏn,” 2000, pp. 7–8.
103. Intellectuals, “Chosŏn,” 2000, p. 9.
104. Intellectuals, “Chosŏn,” 2000, pp. 7–9.
105. The CCDM—the Minju Ŏllon Simin Yŏnhap 민주언론시민연합—was established by dissident journalists in 1984 who, since 1985, were issuing the monthly *Mal* and, in 1988, were influential in establishing the daily *Hankyoreh*. A major progressive NGO in 1990s South Korea, the CCDM undertakes media watching and gives (public) lectures on journalism, advocating for the need of media reform. Cf. “Minŏllon yŏnhyŏk,” *Minju ŏllon simin yŏnhap* 민주언론시민연합, http://www.ccdm.or.kr/xe/ccdm_history (accessed 16 October 2021).
106. Kim Tong-min, “Chosŏn ilbo kŏbu chisigin sŏnŏn, kŭ hu,” *Inmul kwa Sasang* (2000.10): 9.
107. “Chosŏn ilbo pandae simin yŏndae ch’ulbŏm (조선일보 반대 시민연대 출범 Establishment of the Federation of Citizens Opposing Chosun Ilbo),” *Hankyoreh*, 21 September 2000.
108. “Now, we are shaking off the long yoke of division and dictatorship, turning towards a new age of democracy and unification. We are the point where we are turning from the Cold War towards living together as equals, from dictatorship towards democracy, from a monopoly

- towards equality, from conflict and feuds towards harmony and concord. However, such a future is not given to us without effort. We still have not been able to overcome the heavy shadow of a dark past cast on all areas of politics, society, economy, culture, religion and education. ... In the face of this calling towards a transitional period, we must emphasize the liberty of the press. ... However, at this day, the shape of media in our countries is ... one in which (the media) stands in retrogression to the current of the times in order to protect its own company's vested interests. Amidst (this media landscape), the one which is the biggest problem is without doubt the Chosun ilbo. Instead of repenting its own past and devoting itself to the efforts of reforming itself as a newspaper of the people, Chosun ilbo is re-igniting the values of the bygone period of the Cold War and dictatorship, using this as a survival strategy and thus having become a target of public criticism. ... Reasons why we are opposing Chosun ilbo. First, ... we point out that Chosun ilbo is undertaking distorted reporting on a daily basis. ... Second, we focus on the shameless distortion of history by Chosun ilbo. ... Third, we oppose the disguise used by Chosun ilbo to refer to its standpoint as "conservative." Source: "Chosŏn ilbo pandae simin yŏndae sŏnŏnmun (조선일보반대 시민연대 발족선언문 Proclamation of the Federation of Citizens Opposing Chosun Ilbo)," *Chosŏn Ilbo Pandae Simin Yŏndae* 조선일보반대 시민연대, <http://www.antichosun.or.kr/info3.htm> (accessed via the Wayback Machine, 11 October 2001).
109. Cf. the following papers for these Anti-Chosun-internal debates. Hong, "Pan-chosŏn," 2000, pp. 13–18; Kim Yŏng-in, "Kŭgu ōllon kwŏllyŏk kwa han'guk chisigin ūi mŏsŭp: ant'i chosŏn undong ūl parabonŭn sisŏn," *Chungdŭng uri kyoyuk* (2000.9): 30–31; Kim Ch'ang-nam, "Int'ŏnet ūi ant'i chosŏn undong," *Hwanghae munhwa* 28 (2000): 372–380; and Kim, "Chosŏn," 2000, pp. 7–14; Kim, "Ant'i," 2000, pp. 13–18.
110. Kim Tong-min, "'Taŭm tangye nŭn Chosŏn kudok kŏbu undong," *Wŏlgan mal* (2001.7): 174–175.
111. Quoted after Kim, "Ant'i," 2000, p. 16.
112. Kim, "Ant'i," 2000, p. 16.
113. Kim, "Chaengjŏm," 2002, pp. 138–139.
114. Ko Kil-sŏp, "Ant'i chosŏn undong kwa ttodarŭn yŏngyedŭl," *Chŏnŏllijŭm pip'yŏng* 31 (2000.9): 51–56.
115. Kim, "Chaengjŏm," 2002, p. 128.
116. "Chosŏn ilbo pandae simin yŏndae hwaldong kyehoek (조선일보반대 시민연대 활동 계획 Plans for future activities of the ACF)," *Chosŏn Ilbo Pandae Simin Yŏndae* 조선일보반대 시민연대, <http://www.antichosun.or.kr/info4.htm> (accessed via the Wayback Machine, 11 October 2001).
117. "Minju ōllon ūl hyang han uji khan kŏrŭm (민주언론을 향한 우직한 걸음 Naïve and honest steps towards a democratic press)," *Minju ōllon simin yŏnhap* 민주얼른시민연합, http://www.ccdm.or.kr/xe/ccdm_history (accessed 7 October 2021).
118. Chosŏn Ilbo Pandae Simin Yŏndae, ed. *Wae?*, 2000.
119. Chosŏn ilbo pan-minjok, pan-t'ong'il haengwi e tae han mingan pŏpchŏng ch'ujin wiwŏnhoe, ed. *Chosŏn ilbo pan-minjok, pan-t'ong'il haengwi e tae han mingan pŏpchŏng paeksŏ*. Seoul: Inmul kwa sasang-sa, 2002.
120. Chosŏn Ilbo Pandae Simin Yŏndae, ed. *Han sigan humyŏn sesang i talla poinda* (Seoul: Inmul kwa sasang-sa, 2004): 109–204.
121. "Ch'ong-chŏngni ant'i-chosŏn nonjaeng sisibibi (총정리 안티조선논쟁 시시비비 Summarizing the rights and wrongs of the Anti-Chosun dispute)," *Sin tonga* (2000:10): 116–125.
122. The full text of the inaugural proclamation can be retrieved in: "Chosŏn ilbo ro putŏ ūi Okch'ŏn tongnip sŏn'ŏnsŏ chŏnmun (조선일보로부터의 옥천독립선언서 전문 Full text of the declaration of independence from Chosun ilbo in Okch'ŏn)," *Ohmynews*, 28 November 2000.

123. “Chosŏn ilbo paro pogi Okch’ŏn simin moim’ kongsik ch’ulbŏm (‘조선일보 바로 보기 옥천시민 모임’ 공식 출범 Formal constitution of the Okch’ŏn Citizen’s Gathering to Properly Understand Chosun Ilbo),” *Okch’ŏn sinmun*, 19 August 2000.
124. “Ŏllon paro,” *Hankyoreh*, 23 March 2020.
125. A high-resolution screenshot of this website is available at <https://tinyurl.com/antichosun>.
126. Kim, “Chaengjŏm,” 2002, pp. 131–133.
127. Kim, “Chaengjŏm,” 2002, pp. 129–130.
128. *Okch’ŏn chŏnt’u*, Movie by Hwang Ch’ŏl-min. 2001.
129. “Tongnipgun undong, “Mindŭllae” ch’ŏrŏm chŏnguk hwaksan ŭl’ (‘독립군 운동, ‘민들레’처럼 전국 확산을’ Movement of the independence soldiers, hoping to spread nationally just like *Mindŭllae*),” *Okch’ŏn sinmun*, 28 November 2000.
130. For a brief overview over the tumultuous events during the presidential election of 2002, cf. Lee, Hong Yung, “South Korea in 2002: Multiple Political Dramas,” *Asian Survey* 43.1 (2003): 65–72.
131. The story of the two later arch rivals as a “mingled fate” rooted in their running in the 1996 election in the district of Jongno is narrated in Yang Wŏn-bo. *1996-nyŏn Chongno, No Mu-hyŏn kwa Yi Myŏng-bak: ŏtkallin unmyŏng ŭi sijak* (Seoul: Wisdomhouse), 2018.
132. “2000-nyŏn ch’ongsŏn simin yŏndae hwaldong: yugwŏnjadŭl kwa hamkke mandŭrŏnaen sŏngo hyŏngmyŏng (2000년 총선시민연대 활동 – 유권자들과 함께 만들어 낸 선거혁명 The activities of the 2000 General Election Citizen’s Federation: a political revolution made together with the voters),” *Ch’amyŏ Yŏndae*, <https://www.peoplepower21.org/pspd100/1338984> (accessed 15 October 2021).
133. Kang Chun-man wrote an essay on how Chosun ilbo reacted to the challenge presented by the ECS. Cf. Kang Chun-man, “Ch’ongsŏn simin yŏndae wa Chosŏn ilbo,” *Inmul kwa sasang* (2000.3): 15–27.
134. Kim Chin-guk: “Ch’ongsŏn simin yŏndae naksŏn undong p’yŏngga,” *Sahoe kwahak yŏn’gu* 14 (2001): 347–348.
135. On Nosamo’s establishment, cf. Kang Wŏn-t’aek, “Int’ŏnet chŏngch’i chiptan ŭi hyŏngsŏng kwa ch’amyŏ: Nosamo rŭl chungsim ŭro,” *Han’guk kwa kukche chŏngch’i* 20.3 (2004): 164–174; or Eui, “Presidential Elections,” pp. 34–39.
136. In the documentary *No Mu-hyŏn imnida / Our President* (2017), minutes 01:21:08–01:21:18 and 01:23:51, Anti-Chosun banners and stickers are seen prominently at the MDP primaries.
137. “No Mu-hyŏn hubo Inch’ŏn kyŏngsŏn yŏnsŏl chŏnmun (노무현 후보 인천경선 연설 전문 Candidate Roh Moo-hyun’s full speech at the Incheon primary),” *Ohmynews*, 6 April 2002.
138. The media framing of Roh Moo-hyun has been subject to three monographs by Kang Chun-man: *No Mu-hyŏn kwa kungmin sagigŭk* (Seoul: Inmul kwa sasang-sa), 2001; *No Mu-hyŏn chugigi* (Seoul: Inmul kwa sasang-sa, 2003); and *No Mu-hyŏn salligi* (Seoul: Inmul kwa sasang-sa, 2003).
139. From February–June 2001, over 400 investigators entered the offices of 23 media outlets, among them *Chosun ilbo*, *Tonga ilbo*, and KBS, eventually arresting Pang Sang-hun of *Chosun ilbo* and others. The first such investigation for tax avoidance since 1994, the conservative dailies, most notably *Chosun ilbo*, vehemently opposed the investigation, decrying it as a suppression of the free press. Cf. “Ŏllon-sa semu chosa ŭimi wa p’ajang (언론사 세무조사 의미와 파장 The meaning and implications of the media tax investigation),” *Hankyoreh*, 20 June 2001.
140. “No Mu-hyŏn komun, Chosŏn ilbo int’ŏbyu kŏbu (노무현 고문, 조선일보 인터뷰 거부 Roh Moo-hyun boycotting interviews with *Chosun ilbo*),” *Ohmynews*, 14 November 2001.
141. Yu Si-min, *No Mu-hyŏn ūn wae chosŏn ilbo wa ssaunŭnga?* (Seoul: Kaema kowŏn, 2002), pp. 28–68. Interestingly, the journalist involved in these articles, and in a later article on an alleged yacht owned by Roh, was U Chong-ch’ang, who also wrote the article in the November 1998 issue of *Wŏlgan chosun* that led to the Choi Chang-jip Incident.



142. “Öllon i simin üi p’yön e söttön yöksa nün öpsössümnida’: Minju-dang No Mu-hyön komun Taegu sö konggae t’ükkang (“언론이 시민의 편에 섰던 역사는 없었습니다” 민주당 노무현 고문 대구서 공개특강 “The press had no history of being on the side of the people”: MDP advisor Roh Moo-hyun at a special lecture in Taegu),” *Ohmynews*, 12 July 2001.
143. “Chosön ömnün arumdaun sesang mandülja’: Okch’ön esö chön’guk Chosön ilbo pandae tongnipkun moim kajyö (“<조선> 없는 아름다운 세상 만들자” 옥천에서 전국 조선일보 반대 독립군 모임 가져) (“Let’s make a beautiful world without Chosun ilbo”: Assembly of Anti-Chosun independence soldiers from all around the country in Okch’ön),” *Ohmynews*, 19 January 2001.
144. “No Mu-hyön chijjadül kwa ‘ant’i chojungdong’: Nosamo, chöltk undong e nasö (노무현 지지자들과<안티 조중동> : 노사모, 절독 운동에 나서) (The supporters of Roh Moo-hyun and “Anti-Chojungdong”: Nosamo embarking on a movement to stop reading conservative dailies),” *Ohmynews*, 9 April 2002.
145. “Ümmoron baehu e Nosamo ga issötta? 27-il pam Ich’ön Tökp’yöng Suryönwön sö kajyö, No Mu-hyön pubu ch’amsök (음모론 배후에 노사모가 있었다? 27일밤 이천 덕평수련원서 가져, 노무현 부부 참석) (Was Nosamo behind the conspiracy theory (speech)? Roh Moo-hyun and his wife joining an event at the Duckpyung Youth Center on 27)” *Ohmynews*, 29 April 2002.
146. “Nosamo, Chosön 50-manbu ‘chöltk undong’ sön’ön(;) Pak Wön-hong-ssi ‘chöltk undong ün sahoejuüjök saenggak: Nosamo, ‘chop’ok sinmun kwa üi chönjaeng’ sönp’o ... Pak Wön-hong, Kim Yun-su ssi koso do (노사모, <조선> 50만부 ‘절독운동’ 선언 박원홍씨 “절독 운동은 사회주의적 생각”: 노사모, ‘조폭신문과의 전쟁’ 선포...박원홍-김윤수 씨 고소도) (Nosamo declaring a movement to bring down the subscriptions of *Chosun ilbo* by 500,000; Pak Wön-hong: “This boycott is a socialist way of thinking”: Nosamo declaring a ‘war on the vulgar media’ and even suing Pak Wön-hong and Kim Yun-su),” *Ohmynews*, 13 May 2002.
147. “Nosamo üi ‘Chosön ilbo 50-manbu chöltk undong’ chiji handa: chön’guk ‘mulch’ong tongnipkun’ üi ponggi (노사모의 ‘조선일보 50만부 절독운동’ 지지한다: 전국 ‘물총독립군’의 봉기) (Mulch’ong independence soldiers from around the country in support of the Nosamo “lowering Chosun ilbo subscriptions by 500,000”-campaign),” *Ohmynews*, 15 May 2002.
148. “Nosamo chöltk sön’ön kyegi ant’i-chosön tasi pongyökhwa (노사모 절독선언 계기 안티조선 다시 본격화) (A new intensification for Anti-Chosun due to the declaration of lowering-subscriptions by Nosamo),” *Ohmynews*, 18 May 2002.
149. “‘Chop’ok öllon chöltk’ ün sobija undong(;) Nosamo, chöngch’i hwaldong sön’ön han chök öpta’ (“조폭언론 절독’은 소비자 운동노사모, 정치활동 선언한 적 없다”) (“The ‘boycott of the vulgar press’ is a consumer movement; Nosamo has not proclaimed to do political movements),” *Ohmynews*, 19 May 2002.
150. “‘Chop’ok öllon chöltk’ ün,” *Ohmynews*, 19 May 2002.
151. “Choase e tae hayö (조아세에 대하여 On Joase),” *Chosön ilbo ömnün arumdaun sesang* 조선일보 없는 아름다운 세상, <http://www.joase.org/joaseorg.htm> (accessed via the Wayback Machine, 11 August 2002).
152. Insamo (인사모), an abbreviation of Inmul kwa Sasang üi Sarang hanün Saramdül üi Moim (인물과 사상을 사랑하는 사람의 모임 Assembly of those who love *Inmul kwa Sasang*) was established in April 2000. Born out of journal’s homepage’s bulletin board, the group became a registered organization thereafter, assembling supporters and advocates of Kang Chun-man. Insamo was established roughly at the same time as Nosamo (cf. further below).
153. While the inaugural declaration on Joase’s homepage, as available of October 2021, does not mention a date, June 2002 is mentioned as the date of its establishment in two newspaper articles: “Chosön ilbo–Ant’i-chosön undong chöngmyön ch’ungdol (조선일보-안티조선운동 정면충돌 Full clash of *Chosön ilbo* and Anti-Chosun),” *Hankyoreh*, 29 October 2002; and “Uri do Chosön ilbo rül koso handa’: ‘Joase’ mat-koso... kongjöng köraewi, sinmun hyöphoe do kobal (“우리도 <조선일보>를 고소한다” ‘조아세’ 맞고소... 공경거래위-신문협회도 고발 “We will



- also sue *Chosun ilbo*”: Joase’s counter-accusation ...the Fair Trade Commission and the Newspapers Association also complain),” *Ohmynews*, 8 November 2002.
154. “Uri do,” *Ohmynews*, 8 November 2000.
155. “‘Tongnip kinyömgwan sô Chosôn yunjön’gi ppaera’: kyönggi minölylön tûng, 15-il tongnip kinyömgwan chöngmunsô sômyöng undong chönggae (“독립기념관서 <조선> 윤전기 빼라” 경기민언련 등, 15일 독립기념관 정문서 서명운동 전개 “Get the *Chosun* printing press out of the Independence Hall!”: The Gyeonggi CCDM and others, gathering signatures at the main gate of Independence Hall on the 15th),” *Ohmynews*, 16 August 2002.
156. *Ttak* highlights how the newspaper printed the Japanese flag atop its title, how its funter Pang Ũn-mo was considered a collaborator, or how the newspaper had welcomed Park Chung-hee’s Yusin constitution and distorted reporting on the Kwangju massacre. Source: “‘*Ttak* ün Chosôn ilbo rül kkünnün sori’: ‘ant’i-chosôn tongnipkun’ choase üi hongboyong soch’aekcha *Ttak* (“<딱>은 조선일보를 끄는 소리” ‘안티조선 독립군’ 조아세의 홍보용 소책자 <딱> *Ttak* is the voice to end Chosun ilbo: the promotional booklet *Ttak* of Joase’s ‘Anti-Chosun soldiers of independence’),” *Ohmynews*, 10 September 2002. Unfortunately, due to COVID-19-related travel restrictions, the author has not been able to acquire a copy of the booklet as of today.
157. “Ol ch’usök en Chosôn ilbo rül yaegi haseyo: ant’i-chosôn, Söul-yök tûng sô kwisönggae sangdae ‘Chosôn ilbo pandae’ yuinmul baep’o (올 추석엔 조선일보를 얘기하세요 안티조선, 서울역 등서 귀성객 상대 ‘조선일보 반대’ 유인물 배포 Please talk about *Chosun ilbo* this upcoming Chusök: Anti-Chosun handing out printed materials in opposition to Chosun ilbo to people heading home at Seoul station and other places),” *Ohmynews*, 21 September 2002.
158. Over the next weeks and months, Joase activists also began making and distributing Anti-Chosun newspapers—leaflets in the layout and size of a Korean newspaper.
159. “Choase ‘uri chujang konggae t’oron haja’, Chosôn ‘pulmae undong ün öllon chayu ch’imhae: Chosôn, ant’i-chosôn hoewöndül e ch’öt-ponsa ch’awön sosong (조아세 “우리 주장 공개토론 하자” 조선 “불매 운동은 언론자유 침해” <조선>, 안티조선 회원들에 첫 본사차원 소송 Joase: “Let us discuss our arguments in a public debate!”), Chosun: “A boycott movement is infringing on a free press!”: the first trial of Chosun headquarters against Anti-Chosun activists),” *Ohmynews*, 29 October 2002.
160. “‘Pyönghwa üi chök, konggong üi chök, Chosôn ilbo’: 17-il ohu, Söul Chongmyo kongwön esô ‘pyönghwa üi chök konggong üi chök Chosôn ilbo kyut’an chön’guk taehoe’ yölgi huggün (“평화의 적, 공공의 적, 조선일보”: 17일 오후, 서울 종묘공원에서 ‘평화외적 공공외적 조선일보 규탄 전국대회’열기 후관 *Chosun ilbo*, Enemy of the people, enemy of the public: ‘national assembly to denounce *Chosun ilbo*, enemy of peace, enemy of the public’ held at Seoul’s Chongmyo park on the 17th),” *Ohmynews*, 17 November 2002.
161. “Chosôn ilbo üi sonjön p’ogo? Chosôn ilbo ‘Choase’ rül koso hada (조선일보의 선전포고? 조선일보 ‘조아세’를 고소하다 A declaration of war by *Chosun ilbo*? *Chosun ilbo* suing Choase),” *Ohmynews*, 24 October 2002.
162. During the Ch’oe Incidents, the defamation lawsuits against Ch’oe, Kang or Chöng were filed by individual journalists like Lee Han-u or Cho Gap-je, not *Chosun ilbo* as a corporation.
163. Also: “‘Chosôn ilbo üi isöng hoebok ül ch’okku handa’: Chosôn ilbo üi ‘Choase’ koso rül parabomyö (“조선일보의 이성 회복을 촉구한다” 조선일보의 ‘조아세’ 고소를 바라보며 “Urging *Chosun ilbo* to recover reason”: observing the trial of *Chosun ilbo* against Joase),” *Ohmynews*, 25 October 2002; cf. also “Choase ‘uri,” *Ohmynews*, 29 October 2002; and “Uri do,” *Ohmynews*, 8 November 2002.
164. Newsweek’s opinion poll shows a 48% support (12% high support, 36% somewhat support) for the Anti-Chosun Movement among Koreans in their 30s. Source: *Newsweek Korea*, quoted after “Choase ‘uri,” *Ohmynews*, 29 October 2002.
165. Cho Kap-je (조갑제 趙甲濟, 1945–) is a Korean journalist and essayist. He was chief editor at *Wölgan Chosôn* from 1991–1996 and from 1998–2004, and the first CEO of *Wölgan Chosôn*

- from 2001–2005. Cho is known for his far-right, anti-communist views—even within the conservatives: in 2005, he was fired from Chosun ilbo over a comment that “pro-North” was even worse than “pro-Japanese,” and in the wake of this, has established chogabje.com as his private blog and news outlet. There, he continues to write commentary until the present.
166. “Chosŏn ilbo ūi sonjŏn,” *Ohmynews*, 24 October 2002.
167. “Uri do,” *Ohmynews*, 8 November 2002.
168. “Nosamo, simin danch’e ro chŏnhwan hagil: No Mu-hyŏn tangsŏnja rŭl sŏnggong han daet’ongnyŏng ūro mandŭrŏya (노사모, 시민단체로 전환하길: 노무현 당선자를 성공한 대통령으로 만들어야 The need for transforming Nosamo into a civic organization: we must make Roh Moo-hyun a successful president),” *Ohmynews*, 21 December 2002.
169. “Nuga Nosamo haech’e rŭl iyagi hanŭnga! Nosamo ga naagaya hal panghyang kwa namgyŏjin kwajedŭl (누가 노사모 해체를 이야기하는가! 노사모가 나아가야 할 방향과 남겨진 과제들 Who dares to speak about disbanding Nosamo! The road forward and open issues for Nosamo),” *Ohmynews*, 21 December 2002. Similarly, Insamo members hailed Roh’s election as a “revolution” in a system consisting of a “power cartel” consisting of the GNP (as the direct successor to Park’s Yushin system in opposition to the “people”) and *Chojungdong*. Source: “Han’guk kwŏllyŏk ūn Hannara–Chojungdong yŏnhapch’e: Insamo songnyŏnhoe, Chŏng Kyŏng-hŭi sŏnsaeng kohŭi ch’ukha hamyŏ ōllon kaehyŏk tajim (“한국 권력은 한나라-조중동 연합체”: 인사모 송년회, 정경희 선생 고회 축하하며 언론개혁 다짐 Power in South Korea is a federation of the GNP and Chojungdong: Prof. Chŏng Kyŏng-hŭi at his seventieth birthday pledging oneself to media reform),” *Ohmynews*, 24 December 2002.
170. The term *Chojungdong* has first been used by *Hankyoreh* in October/November 2000. In *Kyunggyang sinmun*, it first appears in a column by Kang Chun-man in October 2001. As Ha Chong-mun has shown, Tonga ilbo, critical of conservative efforts to revise historical memory until 1999, amidst the intensifying collaborator discourse, underwent a ‘conversion’ to the right around 2000/01. Cf. Ha Chong-mun, “Pan-il minjokjuŭi wa nyurait’ŭ,” *Yŏksa pip’yŏng* 78 (2007): 177–180.
171. “Han’guk kwŏllyŏk,” *Ohmynews*, 24 December 2002.
172. The institutionalization of the New Right movement has previously been analyzed by the author in: Vierthaler, “A Reconsideration,” 2020, pp. 45–48. Cf. also Tikhonov, “Rise and Fall,” pp. 9–24.
173. Vierthaler, “A Reconsideration,” 2020, pp. 62.
174. Vierthaler, “A Reconsideration,” 2020, pp. 53–54.
175. Kim, *Chosŏn*, 2000, pp. 18–19.
176. Kim et al., *Chosŏn ilbo rŭl*, 1999, pp. 65–90; Kim, “Ant’i,” 2000, pp. 13–37; and Kim Tong-min, *Uri nŭn wae Chosŏn ilbo rŭl kŏbu hanŭnga?* (Seoul: Paegŭi 2001): 23–48. Before the ACF and its activities, praise of Syngman Rhee and Park Chung-hee in the *Chosun ilbo* had already caught the attention of Urimodu users. Source: Kim, “Kŭgu ōllon,” 2000, pp. 26–27.
177. Kim, “Ant’i,” 2000, p. 20.
178. Kim et al., *Chosŏn ilbo rŭl*, 1999, pp. 69–81.
179. Kim et al., *Chosŏn ilbo rŭl*, 1999, pp. 82–83.
180. Kang, *Kim Tae-jung*, 1995, pp. 32–33.
181. Kim et al., *Chosŏn ilbo rŭl*, 1999, pp. 81–82.
182. Kang et al., *Chosŏn ilbo konghwaguk*, 1999, pp. 82–117.
183. Kang et al., *Chosŏn ilbo konghwaguk*, 1999, pp. 83–84.
184. Kang et al., *Chosŏn ilbo konghwaguk*, 1999, pp. 103–104.
185. Kang et al., *Chosŏn ilbo konghwaguk*, 1999, pp. 111–117.
186. These articles were first presented in this context by Chŏng Chi-hwan in the December 1998 issue of *Mal*, and then later repeated in Kim Tong-min’s writings and the civic tribunal indictment. Chŏng Chi-hwan, “Chosŏn ilbo ch’inil haenggak: han’il pappang ūn Chosŏn ūi haengbok ūl wi han choyak,” *Wŏlgan mal* (1998:12): 98–101; Kim, “Ant’i,” 2000, pp. 20–24,

- and Kim, *Uri nŭn*, 2001, pp. 37–39; and Chosŏn ilbo pan-minjok ..., *Chosŏn ... paeksŏ*, 2002, pp. 31–32.
187. “P’yŏnghwa t’ong’il ūl wi han sin-ch’eje (平和統一을 위한 新體制 A new system for a new era),” *Chosŏn ilbo*, 18 October 1972, quoted after Kim et al., *Chosŏn ilbo rŭl*, 1999, p. 85.
188. “A tragedy of our history is without doubt that, not properly having settled the remnants of pro-Japanese activities, pro-Japanese collaborators played the leading role of history without an excuse, without sanctions, and without any other measures. They continue to prosper without a sense of guilt.” Source: Kim, “Ant’i,” 2000, p. 33.
189. Cf. Shin/Kyung, *Contentious Kwangju*. Similarly, Park Myung-lim evaluates Kwangju as a central watershed in contemporary South Korea. Park, *Yŏksa wa*, 2011, pp. 39–43.
190. “Ingan Chŏn Tu-hwan (人間全斗煥 Chun Doo-hwan, the human),” *Chosŏn ilbo*, 23 August 1980.
191. So for example in Minju Ŏllon ... Pungwa, “Chosŏn ilbo,” *Wŏlgan mal* (1998:10), pp. 133, Kim et al., *Chosŏn ilbo rŭl*, 1999, pp. 85–88; Kim, “Ant’i,” 2000, pp. 27–33; Kim, *Uri nŭn*, 2001, 43–46; and Chosŏn ilbo pan-minjok ..., *Chosŏn ... paeksŏ*, 2002, pp. 66–69.
192. Kim, “Ant’i,” 2000, p. 29.
193. Kim, “Ant’i,” 2000, p. 31.
194. Lee, *The Making of*, pp. 37–42.
195. Chosŏn ilbo pan-minjok ..., *Chosŏn ... paeksŏ*, 2002, pp. 31–99 (indictment) and pp. 178–179 (verdict).
196. The verdict refers to a 1995 law which criminalizes any offences that aim at undermining the constitution or destroying the constitutional order. In the verdict, the court refers to the preamble of South Korea’s constitution, which takes democratic reform and peaceful re-unification as the country’s mission, and judges *Chosun*’s harsh opposition to any forms of détente with the North as an activity guilty under the above laws. Source: Chosŏn ilbo pan-minjok ..., *Chosŏn ... paeksŏ*, 2002, pp. 179–181.
197. Chosŏn ilbo pan-minjok ..., *Chosŏn ... paeksŏ*, 2002, pp. 182–183.
198. Chosŏn ilbo pan-minjok ..., *Chosŏn ... paeksŏ*, 2002, pp. 49–50.
199. In 2010, *Chosun ilbo*’s subscription numbers stood at 1,8 million copies a day compared to 1.31 million (*Chungang ilbo*) and 1.25 million (*Tonga ilbo*) for its closest competitors. The progressive *Hankyoreh*, on the other hand, stood at 283,000 copies, *Kyŏnghyang sinmun* at 267,000. Source: “2010-nyŏn 1-wŏl – 12-wŏl injŭng pusu (2010년 1월 ~ 12월 인증부수 Number of copies from January–December 2010),” *ABC Pusu podo charyo* (ABC 부수보도자료), www.kabc.or.kr/about/issuereference/ (accessed 23 December 2020). The year 2010 is the first year concrete data regarding the distribution of newspapers became available.
200. “(Tandok) Munch’ebu, ‘pusu chojak’ ūihok ABC hyŏphoe ga ch’wiso to koryŏ ([단독] 문체부, ‘부수 조작’ 의혹 ABC협회 허가 취소도 고려 (Exclusive) Ministry of Sports, Culture and Tourism, suspicions of ‘fabricated circulation numbers’: considerations of revoking KABC’s permit),” *Media Today*, 22 February 2021. In April, a report by MBC uncovered that large numbers of printed newspapers were exported unread and re-surfaced, as “paper,” in places such as Thai IKEA stores. Source: “Future of Journalism: IKEA Packing Material,” *The Blue Roof*, <https://www.bluroofpolitics.com/p/future-of-journalism-ikea-packing-material/> (accessed 16 October 2020).
201. Chosŏn ilbo 100-nyŏnsa p’yŏnch’ansil, ed. *Minjok kwa hamkke han segi: kanch’urin Chosŏn ilbo 100-nyŏnsa, 1920–2020* (Seoul: Chosŏn ilbo-sa, 2020): 547–548.

References

Primary Sources

Newspapers: *Tonga ilbo*, *Chosŏn ilbo*, *Chungang ilbo*, *Kyŏnghyang sinmun*, *Hankyoreh*, *Ohmynews*, *Okch'ŏn sinmun*, *Sŏul sinmun*

Monthly magazines: *Inmul kwa sasang*, *Wŏlgan mal*, *Sin tonga*, *Wŏlgan chosŏn*

Online Sources last accessed 15 October 2021

- | | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|
| http://www.journalist.or.kr | [Journalist's Association of Korea] |
| http://www.kabc.or.kr | [Korea Audit Bureau of Certification] |
| http://www.ccdm.or.kr | [Citizen's Council of Democratic Media] |
| https://www.peoplepower21.org | [People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy] |
| http://encykorea.aks.ac.kr/ | [Encyclopedia of Korean Culture] |
| * http://www.joase.org | |
| * http://www.urimodu.com | |
| * http://www.antichosun.go.kr | |
| * http://www.mulchong.com | |
| * = [accessed via the Wayback Machine, https://archive.org/web/] | |

Secondary Sources

- Chin Yong-ju 진용주. “Kŭgu sŏndongji e tae han t'agyŏk: ‘Ant’i-chosŏn’ ūl mannada (극우 선동지에 대한 타격 – ‘안티조선’을 만나다 A blow against a far-right demagogic newspaper: meeting ‘Anti-Chosun’),” *Chungdŭng uri kyoyuk* (중등우리교육) (2000.3): 26–27.
- Ch'oe Chang-jip 최장집 (Choi Chang-jip). *Minjuhwa ihu ūi minjujuŭi* (민주화이후의 민주주의) (Democracy after democratization). Seoul: Humanitas, 2002.
- Chomsky, Noam and Edward S. Hermann. *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 2002).
- Chŏng Chi-hwan 정지환. “‘Chinbo insa chugigi’: Ppuri nŭn ch'inil k'omp'ŭlleksŭ (“진보인사 죽이기”: 뿌리는 친일 콤플렉스 Roots for a witch-hunt of progressives lying in a *ch'inil* complex),” *Wŏlgan mal* (1998.12): 93–97.
- . “Chosŏn ilbo ch'inil haenggak: Han'il pappang ūn chosŏn ūi haengbok ūl wi han choyak (조선일보 친일행각: 한일밥방은 조선의 행복을 위한 조약 The pro-Japanese activities of Chosun ilbo: The myth of resistance is a convention for the well-being of *Chosun*),” *Wŏlgan mal* (1998.12): 98–101.
- . “‘Myŏngye sosong 5-nyŏn chŏnjaeng’ kwa ‘Okch'ŏn chŏnt'u’ ūi ch'uŏk (‘명예소송 5년 전쟁’과 ‘옥천전투’의 추억 A memory of my “five-year defamation lawsuit war” and the “Okch'ŏn Struggle”),” *Hwanghae munhwa* (황해문화) 50 (2006): 437–446.
- Chosŏn ilbo Pandae Simin Yŏndae 조선일보반대 시민연대, ed. *Wae? Chosŏn ilbo inga* (왜? 조선일보인가 Why *Chosun ilbo*?). Seoul: Inmul kwa Sasang-sa 인물과 사상사, 2000.
- . *Han sigan humyŏn sesang i talla poida* (한 시간 후면 세상이 달라 보인다 In an hour, the world will look different). Seoul: Inmul kwa Sasang-sa 인물과 사상사, 2004.
- Chosŏn ilbo 100-nyŏnsa p'yŏnch'ansil 조선일보100년사편찬실 et al., ed. *Minjok kwa hamkke han segi: Kanch'urin Chosŏn ilbo 100-nyŏnsa, 1920–2020* (민족과 함께 한 세기: 간추린 조선일보 100년사: 1920–2020 A century together with the nation: A condensed centennial history of *Chosun ilbo*, 1920–2020). Seoul: Chosŏn ilbo-sa 조선일보사, 2020.
- Chosŏn ilbo pan-minjok, pan-t'ong'il haengwi e taehan mingan pŏpchŏng ch'ujin wiwŏnhoe 조선일보 반민족, 반통일 행위에 대한 민간법정 추진위원회, ed. *Chosŏn ilbo pan-minjok, pan-t'ong'il haengwi e tae han mingan pŏpchŏng paeksŏ* (조선일보 반민족, 반통일 행위에 대한

- 민간법정 백서 White book of the civic trial against anti-national, anti-unification activities of *Chosun ilbo*). Seoul: Inmul kwa Sasang-sa 인물과 사상사, 2002.
- Chun, Ja-hyun and Jung-Sun Han. "Delayed Reconciliation and Transitional Justice in Korea: Three Levels of Conditions for National Reconciliation," *Asian Journal of Social Science* 45 (2017): 294–315.
- Chung, Jongpil. "Comparing Online Activities in China and South Korea: The Internet and the Political Regime," *Asian Survey* 48.5 (2008): 727–751.
- Eui, Hang Shin. "Presidential Elections, Internet Politics, and Citizens Organizations in South Korea," *Journal of Asian Sociology* 34.1 (2005): 25–47.
- Ha Chong-mun 하중문. "Pan-il minjokjuüi wa nyurait'ü (반일민족주의와 뉴라이트 Anti-Japanese nationalism and the New Right)," *Yöksa pip'yöng* 역사비평 78 (2007.2): 175–197.
- Han Yun-hyöng 한윤형. *Ant'i chosön undongsa* (안티조선운동사 A history of the Anti-Chosun Movement). Seoul: T'eksüt'ü 텍스트, 2000.
- Hong Hyön-söng 흥현성. "Pan-Chosön ilbo undong üi chinjja üimi (반조선일보 운동의 진짜 의미 The real meaning of the Anti-Chosun Movement)," *Inmul kwa sasang* 인물과사상 (2000.9): 13–18.
- Jin, Dal Yong. "How to Understand Digital Korea." In *Routledge Handbook of Korean Culture and Society*, edited by Youna Kim, 179–192, London: Routledge, 2016.
- Kang Chun-man 강준만. *Taet'ongnyöng kwa yöron chojak: Ronaldü Reigön üi imiji chöngch'i* (대통령과 여론조작: 로널드 레이건의 이미지 정치 The president and manipulation of public opinion: Ronald Reagan and the politics of image). Seoul: T'aeam 대암, 1989.
- . *Han'guk öllon kwa yöron chojak* (한국언론과 여론조작 The Korean media and manipulation of public opinion). Seoul: Iron kwa silch'on 이론헌과 실천, 1992.
- . *Öllon ün k'amelleon inga* (언론은 카멜레온인가 Is the press a chameleon?). Seoul: Konggan 공간, 1993.
- . *Kim Yöng-sam chöngbu wa öllon* (김연삼정부와 언론 The Kim Yöng-sam administration and the press). Seoul: Kaema kowön 개마고원, 1993.
- . *Kim Tae-jung chugigi* (김태중죽이기 Kim Dae-jung witch-hunt). Seoul: Kaema kowön 개마고원, 1995.
- . et al. *Chosön ilbo konghwaguk* (조선일보공화국 The republic of *Chosun ilbo*). Seoul: Inmul kwa sasang-sa 인물과 사상사, 1999.
- . "Ch'ongsön simin yöndae wa Chosön ilbo (총선시민연대와 조선일보)," *Inmul kwa sasang* (인물과 사상) (2000.3): 15–27.
- . *No Mu-hyön kwa kungmin sagigük* (노무현과 국민사기극 Roh Moo-hyun and national fraud). Seoul: Inmul kwa Sasang-sa 인물과 사상사, 2001.
- . *No Mu-hyön chugigi* (노무현죽이기 Roh Moo-hyun witch-hunt). Seoul: Inmul kwa sasang-sa 인물과 사상사, 2003.
- . *No Mu-hyön salligi* (노무현살리기 Roh Moo-hyun revival). Seoul: Inmul kwa sasang-sa 인물과 사상사, 2003.
- . *Han'guk hyöndaesa sanch'aek* (한국현대사산책 Strolling Korean contemporary history), 23 Vols. Seoul: Inmul kwa sasang-sa 인물과 사상사, 2002–2011.
- Kang, Jiyeon. *Igniting the Internet: Youth and Activism in Postauthoritarian South Korea*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2016.
- Kang Wön-t'aek 강원택. "Int'önet chöngch'i chiptan üi hyöngsöng kwa ch'amyö: Nosamo rül chungsim üro (인터넷 정치 집단의 형성과 참여: 노사모를 중심으로)," *Han'guk kwa kukche chöngch'i* (한국과 국제정치) 20.3 (2004): 161–184.
- Kim, Andrew Eungi. "Civic Activism and Korean Democracy: The Impact of Blacklisting Campaigns in the 2000 and 2004 General Elections," *The Pacific Review* 19.4 (2006): 519–542.
- Kim Ch'ang-nam 김창남. "Int'önet üi ant'i chosön undong (인터넷의 안티조선 운동 The Anti-Chosun Movement in the internet)," *Hwanghae munhwa* (황해문화) 28 (2000): 372–380.

- Kim Chin-guk 김진국. "Ch'ongsón simin yōndae naksón undong p'yōngga (총선시민연대 낙선운동 평가 An evaluation of the 2000 GECS movement to outvote candidates)," *Sahoe kwahak yōn'gu* (사회과학연구) 14 (2001): 335–351.
- Kim Chōng-in 김정인. *Yōksa chōnjaeng: Kwagō rül haesōk hanūn ssaum* (역사 전쟁: 과거를 해석하는 싸움 (History wars: the struggles over the interpretation of the past). Seoul: Ch'aeksasang ch'ekseang, 2016.
- Kim Chong-yōp 김중엽, ed. *87-nyōn ch'ejeron* (87년 체제론 Discussing the 1987 System). Seoul: Changbi 창비, 2009.
- Kim, Dong-Choon. "The Long Road Toward Truth and Reconciliation: Unwavering Attempts to Achieve Justice in South Korea," *Critical Asian Studies* 42.4 (2010): 525–552.
- Kim, Eun-mee. "Digital media and the rise of connected individuals in Korea." In *Routledge Handbook of Korean Culture and Society*, edited by Youna Kim, 231–241, London: Routledge, 2016.
- Kim, Hun Joon. *The Massacred at Mt. Halla: Sixty Years of Truth Seeking in South Korea*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014.
- Kim, Mikyoung, ed. *Korean Memories and Psycho-Historical Fragmentation*. London: Routledge, 2019.
- Kim Tong-min 김동민 et al. *Chosōn ilbo rül asimnikka?* (조선일보를 아십니까? Do you know Chosōn ilbo?). Seoul: Kaema kowōn 개마고원, 1999.
- . "Uri nūn wae Chosōn ilbo rül kōbu haeya hanūnga (우리는 왜 조선일보를 거부해야 하는가 Why must we boycott Chosōn ilbo?)," *Chōnōllijūm pip'yōng* (저널리즘 비평) 31 (2000.9): 47–50.
- . "Chosōn ilbo kōbu chisigin sōnōn, kū hu (『조선일보』 거부 지식인 선언, 그 후 After the Chosōn ilbo denial intellectual manifesto)," *Inmul kwa sasang* (인물과사상) (2000.10): 7–14.
- . "Ant'i chosōn simin undong ūi yōksajōk ūimi (안티조선 시민운동의 역사적 의미 The historical meaning of Anti-Chosun as a civic movement)." In *Chosōn Ilbo Pandae Simin Yōndae* 조선일보반대 시민연대, ed. *Wae? Chosōn ilbo inga* (왜? 조선일보인가 Why Chosōn ilbo?). Seoul: Inmul kwa Sasang-sa 인물과 사상사, pp. 13–37, 2000.
- . "Poron: Ant'i chosōn nonjaeng kwa simin undong ūrosō ūi sōnggyōk kyujōng (보론: 안티조선 논쟁과 시민운동으로서의 성격 규정 Addendum: the Anti-Chosun dispute and the precise nature of Anti-Chosun as a civic movement)," *Sahoe pip'yōng* (사회비평) 27 (2001.2): 135–145.
- . *Uri nūn wae Chosōn ilbo rül kōbu hanūnga?* (우리는 왜 조선일보를 거부하는가 Why are we boycotting Chosun ilbo?). Seoul: Paegūi 백의, 2001.
- . "Taūm tangye nūn Chosōn kudok kōbu undong (다음 단계는 조선 구독 거부운동 The next step is a movement to boycott reading Chosōn ilbo)," *Wōlgan mal* (월간 말) (2001.7): 174–175.
- . "Chaengjōm 1: Ant'i chosōn 2-nyōn, chindan kwa mosaek (쟁점1 – 안티조선2년, 진단과 모색 Issue 1: Two years of Anti-Chosun, a diagnosis and outlook)," *Sahoe pip'yōng* (사회비평) 34 (2002.12): 12–40.
- . *No Mu-hyōn kwa ant'i Chosōn* (노무현과 안티조선 Roh Moo-hyun and Anti-Chosun). Seoul: Siwa sahoe 시와사회, 2002.
- Kim Yōng-in 김영인. "Kūgu ōllon kwōllyōk kwa Han'guk chisigin ūi mosūp: Ant'i chosōn undong ūl parabonūn sisōn (극우언론권력과 한국 지식인의 모습 – 안티조선 운동을 바라보는 시선 The power of far-right media and the figure of Korean intellectuals: A way of looking at the Anti-Chosun Movement)," *Chungdūng uri kyoyuk* (중등우리교육) (2000.9): 30–31.
- Ko Kil-sōp 고길섭. "Ant'i chosōn undong kwa ttodarūn yōngyedūl (안티조선운동과 또다른 연결들 Anti-Chosun and other links)," *Chōnōllijūm pip'yōng* (저널리즘 비평) 31 (2000.9): 51–56.
- Kwak, Ki-Sung. "Digital media and democratic transition in Korea." In *Routledge Handbook of Korean Culture and Society*, edited by Youna Kim, 218–230, London: Routledge, 2017.
- Kwon, Keedon. "Regionalism in South Korea: Its Origins and Role in Her Democratization," *Politics & Society* 32.4 (2004): 545–574.
- Lee, Hong Yung. "South Korea in 2002: Multiple Political Dramas," *Asian Survey* 43.1 (2003): 64–77.

- Lee, Namhee Lee. *The Making of Minjung*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007.
- Merrill, John. "The Cheju-do Rebellion," *Journal of Korean Studies* 2 (1980): 139–197.
- Minju Ōllon Undong Simin Yōnhap Sinmun Monit'ō Pungwa 민주연론운동시민연합 신문모니터분과. "Chosōn ilbo ūi Chōn Tu-hwan podo kisa nūn 'hyōndaep'an Yongbiōch'ōn-ga' (조선일보의 전환 보도기사는 '현대판 용비어천가' The Chun Doo-hwan articles in Chosōn ilbo are a contemporary version of the Song of *Flying Dragons*)," *Wōlgan mal* (월간말) (1998.10): 132–137.
- Park Myōng-lim (Pak Myung-lim) 박명림. *Yōksa wa chisik kwa sahoe: Han'guk chōnjaeng ihae wa Han'guk sahoe* (역사와 지식과 사회: 한국전쟁 이해와 한국사회 History, Knowledge, and Society: Interpretations of the Korean War after the Kwangju Uprising). Seoul: Nanam 나남, 2011.
- Park T'ae-gyun 박태균. "Segyehwa sidae Han'gukchōk i'nyōm chihyang ūi kiwōn: T'al-naengjōn sigi chōnhu yōksa insik pyōnhwa rūl chungsim ūro (세계화시대 한국적 이념지향의 기원: 탈냉전시기 전후 역사인식 변화를 중심으로 The roots of Korean ideological orientation in an age of globalisation: focussing on the changes in historical views before and after the post-Cold War period)." In *T'al-naengjōnsa ūi insik* (탈냉전사의 인식 Perceptions of post-Cold War history), edited by Pak An-hwi 박안휘 et al., 495–524, Seoul: Han'gilsa 한길사, 2012.
- P'yōnjippu 편집부 (Kang Chun-man 강준만). "Kija rūl sabyōnghwa han Chosōn ilbo (기자를 사병화 (私兵化)한 『조선일보』 Chosun ilbo, who transformed journalists into private soldiers)," *Inmul kwa sasang* (인물과 사상) (1998.12): 60–70.
- Son Hyōk-jae 손혁재. "Chosōn ilbo wa ant'i chosōn undong (조선일보와 안티조선운동 Chosōn ilbo and the Anti-Chosun Movement)," *Hwanghae munhwa* (황해문화) 30 (2001.3): 28–50.
- Shin, Gi-Wook and Kyung Moon Hwang, eds. *Contentious Kwangju: The May 18 Uprising in Korea's Past and Present*. New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003.
- Sakamoto, Rumi, Kitahara Minori and Kim Puja. "The Flawed Japan-ROK Attempt to Resolve the Controversy Over Wartime Sexual Slavery and the Case of Park Yuha," *The Asia-Pacific Journal Japan Focus* 14/5.2 (2016), <https://apjff.org/2016/05/Kitahara.html> (accessed 15 October 2021).
- Song, Yeun-Jee, "Historicizing the Discourse on Pro-Japanese Collaborators in Contemporary Korea from the Late 1970s to the Late 2000s," PhD thesis. University of California Los Angeles, 2013.
- . "Contextualizing the Discourse on Pro-Japanese Collaborators in the Process of Democratization after Democracy," *The Review of Korean Studies* 18.1 (2015): 195–225.
- Tikhonov, Vladimir (Pak No-ja). "The Rise and Fall of the New Right Movement and the Historical Wars in 2000s South Korea," *European Journal of Korean Studies* 18.2 (2019): 5–36.
- U Chong-ch'ang 우중창. "'6.25 nūn Kim Il-sōng ūi yōksajōk kyōldan': 'che-2 ūi kōn'guk' ch'uchin kwa tōburō chumok toenūn Ch'oe Chang-jip ūi Han'guk hyōndaesa sigak ('6.25는 金日成의 역사적 결단: '제2의 건국' 추진과 더불어 주목되는 崔章集의 한국 현대사 시각 'June 25 was a historic decision by Kim Il-sung': Advisor Ch'oe Chang-jip's perspective on history which is receiving even more attention than his push for a 'second foundation')," *Wōlgan chosōn* (월간조선) (1998.11): 206–222.
- Veale, Jennifer. "Seoul Searching," *Foreign Policy* (January/February 2007): 94–96.
- Vierthaler, Patrick. "How to Place August 15 in South Korean History? The New Right, the '1948 Foundation' Historical View and the 2008 Kōn'gukchōl Dispute," *Vienna Journal of East Asian Studies* 10 (2018): 137–174.
- . "1948 as Division or Foundation? The New Right Movement and South Korean Cultural Memory: A Mnemohistorical Approach," Essay published as part of a carousel lecture series "Between Nostalgia and Nausea: Attitudes towards the Past in Contemporary Korea," SEED Olomouc (2020): 1–3. <http://seed.upol.cz/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Patrick-Vierthaler-ESSAY.pdf>.
- . "A Reconsideration of the New Right's Formative Period (2003–2008): Conservative Experiences, Mass Media and Cultural Memory in Post-Authoritarian South Korea," *European Journal for Korean Studies* 20.1 (2020): 35–84.

- . “The New Right and the 1948 Foundation View: A Failed Revision of South Korean Cultural Memory,” *Vienna Journal of East Asian Studies* 13 (2021): 1–33.
- Wada, Haruki. *The Korean War. An International History*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016.
- Yang, Myungji. “The Spectre of the Past: Reconstructing Conservative Historical Memory in South Korea,” *Politics & Society* 49.3 (2021): 337–362.
- Yang, Sungik. “An Old Right in New Bottles: State Without Nation in South Korean New Right Historiography,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 80.4 (2021): 889–909.
- Yang Wŏn-bo 양원보. 1996-nyŏn Chongno, No Mu-hyŏn kwa Yi Myŏng-bak: ōtkallin unmyŏng ūi sijak (1996년 종로, 노무현과 이명박: 엇갈린 운명의 시작 1996, Jongro, Roh Moo-hyun and Lee Myung-bak: The roots of a mingled fate). Seoul: Wisdomhouse, 2018.
- Yi Tong-gi 이동기 and Hong Sŏk-ryul 홍석률. “‘Taehan Min’guk Yŏksa Pangmulgwan’ saŏp pip’an kwa chŏngch’aek taeon (‘대한민국역사박물관’ 사업 비판과 정책 대안 A critique and an alternative policy for the ‘National Museum of Korean History’),” *Yŏksa Pip’yŏng* (역사비평) 99 (2012): 284–313.
- Yu Si-min 유시민. *No Mu-hyŏn ūn wae Chosŏn ilbo wa ssaunŏnga?* (노무현은 왜 조선일보와 싸우는가 Why is Roh Moo-hyun fighting with the *Chosun ilbo*?). Seoul: Kaema kowŏn 개마고원, 2002.